In Mas. Kiddushin, 45b, the gemara discusses a woman who has undergone eirusin but the status of her nesuin is in doubt. The question arises as to whether she can (if she married a kohein) eat of his t'rumah. One element of the answer is that, min hatorah, she can because the eirusin status is enough to allow her to do so regardless of the nesuin status, but the robonon extended the law and require nisuin so as to avoid potential problems that could arise if she, still living in her father's house, brought back any t'rumah from her betrothed. [from note 10 on 45b2 in the Schottenstein, which cites Ketubot 58a-b].

There are other cases where, in order to forestall potential problems, a fence is made around what is min hatorah, allowed, and the practice is to follow the derobonon's forbidding of it.

Is there a master list of such rabbinical enactments forbidding what was mide'oraita permitted? There are, in the gemara, practical consequences, or at least, theoretical halachic implications to these distinctions (see note 14 on 45b2) so a complete list would be helpful in parsing certain halachic arguments.

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    Tempted to VTC as too broad... :) – DonielF Feb 24 at 15:35
  • @DonielF can you help me make it more narrow? I'm already eliminating rabbinic enactments which are in the absence of any other ruling (takanot or derived applications based loosely on text), and enactments which change HOW to do something but don't forbid it (leave the scales in fish blood). – rosends Feb 24 at 15:45
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    @DonielF No joke. The list is surely endless. Forbidding things which are biblically permitted is nearly all of what Chazal do. Chicken in milk. Working on 7 Sivan. Writing on Shabbat with your left hand. Gentile's cooking. Leather shoes on 9 Av. Getting haircuts during Sheloshim. – Double AA Feb 24 at 15:53
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    @rosends So, something like treating poultry as meat, or not saying Shema past midnight? I think the only way you could possibly narrow it down is by limiting it by topic and making a series of these posts, and even then half of them would still be too broad (ex. the one for Hilchos Shabbos). – DonielF Feb 24 at 15:55
  • @DonielF what about just those cases for which the distinction has an impact on an explicit argument in the gemara? Not just ones where the gemara (or some other legal authority) says "this is only forbidden miderobonon" and there is no hair splitting caused by that, but where a fact pattern is given in which because there is a min hatorah permission, we can understand the argument differently (as in the case I cited int he question). – rosends Feb 24 at 20:51

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