Stipulations based on “correct” halacha vs. “לא בשמים היא”

Question

It is my understanding that halacha is determined by individual p'sak. That is, there is no divine body of halacha which we are trying to determine with poskim issuing their p'sak based on what they think "God would pasken". Rather, a person's halachic obligations are defined by his perosnal rav's p'sak, and nothing else. This is my understanding of "לא בשמים היא".

In view of this, I find it difficult to understand a certain halachic phenomenon which I have seen in several instances. When there is a difference of opinion among the halachic authorities as to one's halachic obligation, sometimes the Mishna Berura or the like will advise that one make a stipulation based on what is the "correct" halachic opinion.

For example, there is a machlokes whether or not to say the maariv sh'mone esre twice after forgetting yaaleh v'yavo during mincha of rosh chodesh if it is no longer rosh chodesh that night. Mishna B'rura's advice is to say sh'mone esre again with the following t'nai: "If I am halachically obligated to repeat the amida, then let this repetition satisfy my obligation. If not, let this be simply a t'fillas n'dava."

I have seen the same advice given for whether to say shema before the z'man of the Magen Avraham, if one will be able to say it during shacharis with a minyan before the later z'man of the Gra. "If the halacha follows Magen Avraham, let me be yotzei with this recitation. If the halacha follows the Gra, let this be simply talmud torah, and I'll be yotzei with my later recitation."

But I don't get it. What does it mean "If the halacha follows X"? Go to your rav and get a p'sak. If he paskens to follow X, then by definition, that is the halacha for you. It sounds like the idea is "If God would pasken like X...". But that conflicts with my understanding of the halachic process.

So my question is: How is the condition of such a t'nai as above not paradoxical? How can a stipulation of the form "If halacha follows X... If halacha follows Y..." be reconciled with the idea of "לא בשמים היא"?

Answer 1

Lo Bashmayim means that when your Rav gives you a Psak and you hear a Bas Kol saying otherwise, you should follow your Rav and not the Bas Kol. However there are areas in Halacha where there is no clear Psak as there is a Machlokes between compentent Rabbi's who were or currently are on this world. Since there is no clear Psak we try to saitsfy all Shitos when possible. If your Rav tells you that if you say Kriyas Shema by the Gra's Zeman then it is fine for you to do so, however some Rabanim feel that you should try to make it by the Magain Avraham's Zeman as the Magain Avraham was a reliable authority.

Answer 2

"Lo BeShamaim Hee" tells us that the Heavenly Court cannot decide the law (without the Earthly Court agreeing). The rules of Torah stipulate that it is the Rabbis down here who decide the laws. There is a famous story in the Talmud (Baba Metzia 59B) That illustrates this point. Here's a quote from that story:

But R. Joshua arose and exclaimed: 'It is not in heaven.' What did he mean by this? — Said R. Jeremiah: That the Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, After the majority must one incline.

However, there are rules to how the Earthly Court makes decisions. One such rule (as explained in the Mishna (Ediot 1:5). Is that in order for a later court to overturn the decision of an earlier court, that later court must be greater in number and in wisdom. Because of a concept in Torah Law called Yeridat HaDorot (the decline of the generations), later Courts of Jewish Law would generally (I'm sure there must have been some exceptions, e.g Rav Tanna Hu Upalig) not consider themselves worthy of overturning the rulings of the earlier generations.

To be more precise, Rabbis from different time periods fall into different eras, and as a rule, later eras cannot argue with earlier eras, see here.

So for example, Rabbis in the Mishna may argue with each other (even if they lived in different generations), but a Rabbi in the Talmud could not argue with an opinion brought in the Mishna, unless he could prove that he was basing his opinion on another Rabbi in the Mishna, who himself argued with the first Mishnaic Rabbi.

The same is true for the Halachic Rulers of the later era (Achronim). They generally try not to argue with the Halachic Rulers of earlier era (Rishonim), although they do, when making a ruling, choose to rule like one over the other, using different criteria to make that choice.

[Incidentally, this is where the idea of LeChatchila and BeDiEved come into play. It is basically the Rabbis saying that the Halacha is like so-and-so, and that's what you should ideally do. If you already did it the other way however, you have a Rabbi you can rely on. Alternatively, the Rabbis are saying if you do it this way you will fulfill your obligation according to all authorities, so the ideal thing is to do it that way. If you did it another way, you may have still fulfilled your obligation according to certain opinions]

These days, a Rav cannot innovate Halacha if it goes against what was ruled in earlier eras. He must rely on the writings of earlier eras when formulating his Halachic ruling (he can however, interpret those writings in novel ways, as long as his interpretation is Halachically sound). As such, when faced with a halachic inquiry, the Rav can't just tell you what he thinks, he must look in the sources. There are times when there are different opinions in the sources that don't have a clear-cut resolution. It is times like this that Rav will tell you to try to do what needs to be done in a way that will fulfill all opinions, if possible.

Ruling that way doesn't go against Torah Lo BeShamayim Hee, since the doubt is not in Heaven but down here on earth, amongst the Rabbis.