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What is the difference between a takana and a gezera in both definition and application?

  • may be that takana is a new din, as pruzbul, gzera is an extention of the field of an original narrowed isur, e.g. by suspicion, fear, similitude – kouty Oct 2 '17 at 13:28
  • Why do you assume that these words carry some universal distinct meaning? Where did you see these words in the first place? – mevaqesh Oct 2 '17 at 16:47
  • Whats the similarity? – bluejayke Mar 29 at 2:37
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The following taxonomy of kinds of halachic ruling was culled from the Rambam, Hilkhos Mamrim ch. 2, and includes thoughts learned at a shi’ur given by R’ Yonasan Sachs (who was then of RIETS, now of Lander's College and is still rabbi at the Agudath Israel of Passaic-Clifton).

You only asked about the difference in definition and application of no.s 2 & 3 of the more complete taxonomy, but I think it would be of use to spell out the whole picture of categories of rabbinic interpretation and legislation.

  1. Minhag (custom)- Custom, although not really part of halakhah, can change. Minhag is any act that the masses, on their own, accept. According to the Rambam, to qualify as a minhag the practice must then ratified by the rabbinate. Any minhag that is against actual halakhah, is called a minhag ta’os, a mistaken minhag. Any that is based on a misunderstanding is a minhag shetus, a foolish custom. These two subtypes should not be followed. Any nearly universal minhag is called a minhag Yisrael, and has most of the stringencies of law. Yarmulka and ma’ariv services are two examples of a minhag Yisrael.

  2. Taqana / Din deRabanan (a rabbinic law)- These are set up by the rabbinate, instead of the masses, in order to preserve the spirit of the law. For example, Purim and Chanukah. There are 7 new commandments that are entirely rabbinic. According to the Rambam, who only counts biblical mitzvos amongst the 613, this means there are actually 620 mitzvos altogether.

  3. Gezeira deRabanan (a rabbinic “fence”)- These are enacted to prevent a common cause for breaking the act of the law. For example, one may not place food directly on a fire before Shabbos in order to keep it heated during Shabbos. This is a fence around the law against cooking on Shabbos. To prevent the gezeira from being violated, a metal cover, called a “blech” in Yiddish, is placed on the stove top before Shabbos with the flame (turned to a low setting) under one section and the pot with food placed on the blech. This blech serves as a fence, allowing heating of the food without any danger of violating the law. Note that a “gezeira dirabanan” becomes binding only if the community accepts it. According to the Rambam, a gezeira cannot be overturned. However, a gezeirah where the law’s purpose is included in the legislation is implicitly conditional on the purpose. The problem is in knowing when the purpose is given in the quoted gezeirah, and when the gemara provides a motivation on its own, after quoting the gezeirah. For example, meat must be salted within three days of slaughter, or the prohibited blood will be too soaked into the meat to be retrieved. What about the contemporary situation, where meat is generally frozen solid? Some rule that since the reason is given in the legislation, and the reason doesn’t apply, neither does the time limit. Others rule stringently, presumably because they do not believe the reasoning about the blood being soaked into the meat was part of the legislation as initially codified.

    According to the Tif’eres Yisrael (Ediyos 1), there are actually two sub-categories:

    • Siyag ("fence" in Hebrew; “gezeirah” is Aramaic)- Something that will lead to a future violation to do an error in understanding the law. Such as the ban on mixing poultry and milk, lest people become lenient in mixing meat and milk.
    • Cheshash (concern)- Cases where the threat of violation is in the current situation, because one is in a circumstance where habit taking over or other accident is likely.

    The Tif’eres Yisrael says that a cheshash can be deemed inapplicable if the norms change such that the threat no longer exists. It does not require a beis din that is greater in number or wisdom as the law is not lifted, just that the current situation is deemed to be outside the limits the law addressed.

  4. Asmachta (mnemonic)- The Raavad (on Mamrim 2) considers laws backed by a mnemonic in the Torah are in a different category than other rabbinic laws. He writes that Hashem wrote these asmachtos as a way to suggest laws to us to enact as needed.

  5. Divrei Qabbalah (the words that were received)- i.e. laws enacted by a beis din like the Great Assembly that included nevi’im (prophets). Many consider these rabbinic laws one step closer to Torahitic law than most others, since the law was ratified by consulting with Hashem Himself. This is like the Raavad’s concept of asmachta, but more so — not only suggested by Hashem to be used as needed, but we’re told that the situation justified it.Those who believe this is a distinct category would include Purim as divrei Soferim rather than usual rabbinic law. Some achronim rule that the obligation for women must hear megillah and the other mitzvos of Purim is rabbinic but for men it’s divrei qabbalah. Thus, their obligation is lesser.

  6. Pesaq (a rabbinic ruling)- This ruling addresses a the questionable area of some law or custom. A pesaq that is not prima facie in violation of accepted halakhah can only be overruled by another body that is both larger in number (or perhaps number of students), and greater in “chokhmah”. (The ability to know how to use the facts. Not more knowledgeable book-wise, but more steeped in the Torah weltanschauung.)

  7. Derashah (a law derived by hermeneutics)- Some hold that derashah only serves as support for already known laws, and therefore are tools in pesaq. However others, including the Rambam, see them as constructive, a means for discovering new Torahitic laws. This appears to be supported by a medrash on Rus, in which Boaz is credited as being the first to rule that “Moavi” means males from Moav in particular.

  8. A last category has only two examples, and they are related. Torah law mandates a shevus, a law to rest on Shabbos. It also requires resting from some of the melachos, constructive work activities, even on chol hamo’ed. However, Hashem left it up to man to decide the parameters of these forms of rest.

You asked about the practical disinction between the second and third categories; it is subtle. In order to be a taqana (a din, or issur, or melakhah deRabanan), the prohibited action is one that is similar in purpose to the permitted one.

In contrast, a gezeira does not even require an action. In the example I gave, it was inaction, leaving the pot where it is, that is prohibited. Second, the category includes things that are similar in means to the prohibited act, and will therefore cause confusion about what is and what isn’t okay; and things which will allow people to be caught up in habit, and forget about the prohibition. Only a gezeira may defy an actual Divine law (although a pesaq will often define one), and even so only under specific circumstances. All of the following must be satisfied:

  • The law being protected is more stringent than the one being violated. This determination isn’t easy.
  • The law is being violated only through inaction. No one is being told to actively violate G-d’s commandment.
  • According to the Ta”z, the law being violated will still be applicable in most situations. It still must exist in some form. (Not every acharon agrees with this requirement.)

In another way, a gezeira is less powerful than a regular taqana in that it cannot be compounded. One may not make a “fence” for the express purpose of protecting another “fence”.

A law is considered accepted if it becomes common practice. Any taqana or gezeira that does not get accepted by the masses in the short run, does not become binding in the long run. Similarly, there are rules for pesaq, but they are violated if the masses choose to follows some other rabbinic body’s pesaq. Notice, however, that this need for acceptance is only in the short run, to enact the law. Once a law is accepted, it may only be overruled by pesaq. It does not cease to exist just because it faded out of practice.

  • how does a Shvus fit in? – hazoriz Jan 18 '18 at 12:18
  • @hazoriz - no one answer. It could be a din deOraisa to rest, whose parameters were left to chazal, a special case. (Chol haMo'ed may be another.) Or, it could be a din derabbanan. Briskers have a lot to say on the subject. But the problem pinning it into the taxonomy I suggested is because shevus itself is a open question. Not there there is something wrong with the big picture. – Micha Berger Jan 21 '18 at 17:39
  • @Micha Berger Really? Who says it's dirraysah? I was always taught it's a d rabbunun... Also assuming it's drabbanun which is Mukzah then? – Orion Jul 10 '18 at 2:30
  • As the Briskers put it, Shevus is a din deOraisa that our rabbis define "rest" and pass laws to implement it. In other words, the concept of shevus is deOraisa, but the acts we actually use to implement it are deRabbanan. Obviously, that's not the only model -- and even within that model there is a machloqes rishonim. Here yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/797699 R' Itamar Rosensweig gives a nice summary of various shitos on the subject. They say the same about rest on chol hamo'ed. – Micha Berger Jul 10 '18 at 10:54
  • @Orion: I think the way everyone views various BALC mitzvos is similar. For example, nichum aveilim is deRabbanan, but the mitzvos of chessed and vehalakhta bidrakhav that one is fulfilling is deOraisa. Hashem says something broad, leaving it to us to legislate specifics. But this comment is just my guesswork. – Micha Berger Jul 10 '18 at 10:56
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Succinctly put, in the words of Prof. Dov Zlotnick (The Iron Pillar, 116ff.):

If the purpose of the gezerah in most cases was to forbid something around that was essentially permitted in order to put a fence around the law, that of the takkanah was to make an enactment, a "repair", if you will, insuring the very structure of the law.

G.F. Moore (Judaism Vol. 1, p. 258) distinguishes, briefly, that gezerot are enactments for prohibitions while takkanot are for ordinances of a positive nature. (For a more lengthy detailed analysis of the two, cf. Jewish Encyclopedia s.vv. Gezerah and Takkanah.)

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Takana means improvement. Gezeira means boundary. (Transliterated, lit. cut)

An innovative law meant to accomplish a desired result would be called a takana. A law meant to avoid transgression of an existing law would be called a gezeira. Both have equal status as Rabbinic laws.

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    "Gezeira means boundary." I don't think that's true. – Double AA Jan 18 '18 at 3:47
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Rabbi Ephraim Urbach writes in his sefer "The Halacha-Its sources and development " on pg.7 that takkanot and gezeiros come from the zugot (pairs). He writes that the only diffrence between a gezeirah and takanna is that a takanna is a regulation that intends to correct a situation in a positive manner,whereas a gezarah is prohibitive and restrictive.

A gezeirah is like a syeag (fence) ,its nothing new rather it just places a protective fence around a mitzvah. A Takanna on the other hand,intiates something new in order to correct something.

  • Leining was set up by Moshe's beis din and refined by Ezra's. Hand washing -- Shelomo haMelekh's are these not taqanos? – Micha Berger Oct 3 '17 at 19:07

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