How do Rishonim argue on Drashos Chazal?

Question

There is a known rule that Rishonim cannot argue on the Gemara when it comes to "Halachic" drashos. For example, a Rishon will never give a different answer to a question which the Gemara already answered (Tosfos may ask why the Gemara didn't give that other answer, but he will never give his own answer without more). This is true whether the Gemara's subject is practical Halacha or not.

However, when it comes to aggadic drashos on Tanach, we find Rishonim "disagreeing" with Midrashim and late Acharonim disagreeing on Rishonim. Why do Rishonim feel freer to disagree on an explanation of Chumash than to disagree with a Gemara?

Answer 1

The Rambam writes in one of his letters:

We do not pose difficulties with [i.e. from] the Aggadah. Are they words of Tradition or expressions of reason? Rather each individual considers their explanation as it seems fit to him. In this [Aggadah] there are no words of Tradition, no prohibition and no license, and no law among the Laws; therefore we do not pose difficulties with it. Should you say to me as many have said to me, “Can it be that you apply the term Aggadah [as pertains to this argument] to words of the Talmud?” It is so; all of these words and those similar to them are Aggadah in their reckoning, whether they be written in books of Derashos, whether they be written in books of Aggadah.

This position is echoed by various Ge'onim and Rishonim; see for example Otzar HaGeonim to Chagigah (pp. 59-60) from R. Hai Gaon and R. Shereira Gaon, and the Ramban in his famous Disputation.

Answer 2

In response to YEZ, Feb. 28:

The distinction made in Dynamics of Dispute (pages 125 and following) is not halacha vs. aggadta. It is between teachings by Tannaim (of whatever category) that definitely did not originate with Moses' report of G-d's explanation, and all others. Only the former are candidates for dispute. The Rambam certainly maintains that among those teachings, transmitted to and by the Tannaim (as well as Amoraim), are historical accounts and hashkafic ideas that he likewise accepted as fact. (For example, creation ex-nihilo, and the accounts of the Mabul, Avraham's miraculous escape from Nimrod, and the desert wanderings (see Moreh Nevuchim 3:50 and Hilchos Avoda Zorra 1:3)

The main source for the explanation for why Amoraim abstain from disagreeing with Tannaim (when they do) is a passage in the Talmud Yerushalmi on Payah 2:6:

Said Rebbi Zeyra in the name of Rebbi Yochonon: "If you come across a mishna whose reason you cannot understand, do not brush it aside and replace its law with another one. For many laws were told to Moses at Sinai, and all of them are lodged throughout the Mishna."

Said Rebbi Abbin: "How true! For behold the halacha regarding "two varieties of one grain"[as a prime example]! If Nachum HaLavlar had not come and explained to us [that it was a halacha L'Moshe MiSinai], would we ever have known?!"

From this source, one deduces that immediately following the formulation of the Mishna—the time of Rebbi Yochonon, at the beginning of the era of the Amoraim (c. 4000, 250 CE), the tumultuous state of affairs caused an obscurity over which laws had originated with drashos, permitting challenge, and which laws had really originated from Sinai, precluding question.

As summarized in the final paragraph of that chapter,

All details in the Mishna known not to be kabballos, and all rabbinical decrees not yet voted upon by a Tannaitic Sanhedrin, were challengeable. On such issues, an Amora could conceivably differ with a Tanna. As we mentioned above, there were rare instances in which Amoraim exercised this power.

Answer 3

The original question asked was: "[W]hether the Gemara's subject is practical Halacha or not...Why do Rishonim feel freer to disagree on an explanation of Chumash than to disagree with a Gemara?"

I would answer that the project of the rishonim was to distinguish between the lessons in the Chumash that can be procured through the peshat approach, and those that could be procured only through the drash approach. (And each rishon had his own definition of what qualifies as “peshat.”) They were intent in identifying the peshat level of the pesukim. When they differed with a Midrash in interpreting a posuk, they meant the Midrash’s lesson could not be gained through the peshat approach, but at best through the drash-approach. (And sometimes, they tagged the lesson as a minority and even unacceptable opinion, just as can be the case in halacha.)

Answer 4

In Dynamics of Dispute, Rabbi Lampel points out that in areas of Aggada, we even find Amoraim breaking the Golden Rule and arguing with Tannaim - see for example Megillah 7a in which Shmuel claims he has a better source for the Divine nature of Megillas Ester:

אמר שמואל אי הואי התם הוה אמינא מלתא דעדיפא מכולהו שנאמר קימו וקבלו קימו למעלה מה שקיבלו למטה אמר רבא לכולהו אית להו פירכא לבר מדשמואל דלית ליה פירכא

Said Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have said something better than everything they [the Tannaim] said, as it says etc... Said Rava: All of them [the answers of the Tannaim] have a weakness, but Shmuel's answer does not have a weakness

Rabbi Lampel has a thesis which he uses this to support, namely that the reason in general that Amoraim do not argue with Tannaim is because there was a chain of tradition regarding which halachos were Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai (he proves this with other methods as well), and that chain of tradition was lost in the mayhem of the generation of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Therefore the Amoraim would not argue for fear of inadvertently arguing with a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai. However, in Aggada there is no such concern, and therefore they felt free to argue. (He also concludes from this thesis that if a given Halacha is clearly not from Sinai, for example if a Tanna had an opinion but then changed his mind about it, then an Amora was free to argue on that Halacha as well, and he cites examples of such.)

This would justify arguing with essentially any authority in a discussion of drash-based Aggada.