Imagine that a Halakhic Decisor (decider?) maintains a certain Halakhic position or Hashkafic belief. [I am assuming that such thing as a Hashkafic Decisor exists.] Anyway, is it imperative that s/he necessarily maintain that this position, wherever possible, would apply throughout the entire framework of Halakhah and Hashkafah, and that there could be no contradictions?

(In Yeshivish, the term used for this is "going leshitaso")

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    נ"ל pashut that there is. May 7, 2012 at 3:34
  • @Hacham Gabriel -- Do you mean that it seems to you that there is an imperative for a posek to remain consistent? (I'm guessing that the original poster is trying to say "posek" by using the English term Halakhic Decisor. A clarification on that, too, would be helpful. Otherwise, it looks like there are two questions here, and I can't tell which question is being commented upon.)
    – Shemmy
    May 7, 2012 at 11:31
  • @Shemmy - How come I earn a bravo for that, but I don't earn a bravo for distinguishing between segol and tzeirei? May 9, 2012 at 7:50
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    @Adam Mosheh, I would only suggest that Hacham Gabriel submit it as an answer if he were to clarify which of the two questions he is answering and that he would include a text source.
    – Shemmy
    May 9, 2012 at 20:27
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    Just to be clear, it is the italicized question in parentheses that constitutes an entirely different question. Maybe the original poster did not insert that, but it really does not belong in there because it is unrelated to the core question.
    – Shemmy
    May 10, 2012 at 22:28

1 Answer 1


Not always. Although we certainly find Gemaras that seek to harmonize opinions of a single person into one Shitta, later on it gets different.

In Iggros Moshe (I need to find where) there was a question about a child who learned how to lain a parsha for his Bar Mitzvah, but close to the date, they realized that they had miscalculated his birthday, and his bar mitzvah would only be after that parsha. The question was could he lain anyway.

In the responsum, Rav Moshe Feinstein goes at length about how reading the Torah has to be from someone Bar Mitzva specifically, otherwise the listeners aren't really fulfilling the obligation. However, he quotes earlier Achronim who disagree, seems to be unable to justify their opinion, but yet still lets it go for this case and allows the boy to lain.

This would seem to come from rather than following his own Shitta, recognizing that someone else could rely on a different Shitta and deferring to it - even at the expense of everyone else in Shul.

All of this would seem to apply in a case of need, and really under the recognition that there is no single psak for all Klal Yisroel today. Obviously he would have preferred to follow his Shitta.

I can't imagine such an exception applying to Hashkafa, or why it would need to. Although I could imagine cases where two different suggias suggest different conclusion, and holding them both simultaneously seems, or is contradictory. But that is more a case of having an unresolved paradox, if it is even possible to have a shitta which is fully self consistent.

  • I think all this shows is Rav Moshe didn't really have a fixed belief about whether a child could lain. If he had, then he wouldn't have been meikil.
    – Double AA
    Nov 14, 2013 at 17:38
  • Can you find that chapter in Reb Moshe? Nov 14, 2013 at 19:44
  • @AdamMosheh , Its Igros Moshe OC 2:72
    – sam
    Nov 15, 2013 at 1:30

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