If Exodus 21:22-25 proves the unborn aren't persons, would verses 28-32 imply that slaves aren't persons?

Question

I've heard Exodus 21:22-25 used in support of abortion in some cases, at least to protect the life of the mother. The argument is that if the negligent death of the mother is punishable by death while death to the unborn is merely punishable by a fine (if the premature-birth interpretation is false, anyway), then the fetus must not be an actual person.

Does this reasoning go too far in light of verses 29-32? In this section, if an ox's owner negligently causes someone's death due to not properly addressing the ox's violent tendencies, then the owner can be put to death—but the owner apparently can't be put to death if the ox kills a slave, which instead is punishable by a fine.

Each passage involves causing someone to die out of negligence, and each case can involve the death penalty for the person who acted negligently—but not if the victim is a fetus/slave (again, unless the premature-birth interpretation is used in verses 22-25, anyway). Therefore, should we conclude that a slave is not a person? If not, then is the parallel reasoning used in verses 22-25 flawed in some way? What if the different penalties merely imply a lesser status on the part of the slave/unborn rather than necessarily disproving personhood?

Info: My question is similar to Exodus 21:22–25 Relevance for the issue of abortion. However, my question focuses specifically on the reasoning used in the passage and what parallel reasoning would imply in verses 29-32.

Answer 1

Again, we use the interpretation of the Talmud. Negligence to guard a known-to-be-goring ox resulting in a death means "the owner deserves to be killed" for such horrible misconduct, but instead pays redemption money. (Elsewhere it makes it very, very clear not to allow someone who truly deserves the death penalty to pay his way out of it.) If the ox kills a slave, then the standard price of a slave is paid instead. So no, that's not a proof.

If a master chops his slave's head off, Exodus is quite clear that "there shall be revenge" and the master can be executed. The 24-hour exemption is basically a form of a defense; "I was allowed to hit him to make him work, and oops I hit him too hard." For that matter, if the courts deem someone deserving of lashes and they mistakenly whip him too hard and he dies -- or even in times when it was normal for an apprentice's master to whip his pupil -- in any case where he was allowed to hit the fellow, but mistakenly hit him too hard (or the fellow getting hit was weaker than we thought), we can't charge the attacker with all-out murder.