There seems to be an implied "rule" (or at least strong desire) in Torah (derech halimud) to limit machklokes wherever possible and moreso what seems "at all costs"

My question is simply - Why?

Here's more detail/background on the question:

  • I can understand in cases where there are 2 seemingly contradictory statements from one author (for example 2 Rambam's Mishneh Torah vs. Moreh Nevuchim) - that although it's possible that he changed his mind over time (and thus the latter reflects his true opinion) - this would not be very common, thus fair to assume that there in fact is no contradiction.
  • Or likewise 2 separate (seemingly) contradictory statements from the same author in the same sefer - which would have all the more reason to assume that they in fact do reconcile./don't contradict
  • Likewise, I'm not referring to the mesorah that we received at Sinai, as then it would be understood as unlikely to have 2 contradictory statements from one author (Hashem)
  • Regarding the Written Torah itself (i.e. single sefer (Torah) from single author (Hashem)) - you get involved in the idea of אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים - that allows for contradictory statements from Him (i.e. single author) - so I'm not referring to that.

So basically, since it seems to be self evident that 2 people (especially Jews) can have 2 different opinions on the same matter - why try to reconcile (even to the extent of what seems as very forced answers). Why not "embrace" the different opinions (again where it doesn't imply a break in the chain of mesorah) and especially after than chain was broken (Beis Shammai - Beis Hillel).

On a personal basis, it frustrates me learning with people, who when faced with different seforim (Rishonim, Acharonim) that seem to be saying different opinions, will try to force them into one (so long as it's not explicitely stated otherwise)

I'm curious to know where the source of this "bias"/assumption is ?

I looked in the sefer Halichos Olam, and in Shaar Sheini - 50 he gives an example from Bava Metzia (10b) ואמר ריש לקיש משום אבא כהן ברדלא: קטנה אין לה חצר, ואין לה ארבע אמות. ורבי יוחנן משום רבי ינאי אמר: יש לה חצר ויש לה ארבע אמות This would seem to be a pretty obvious and explicit case where these Amoraim argue. The Halichos Olam says "אע"ג דמשמע דפליגי קאמר התם דחד מיירי בגיטין וחד מיירי במציאה ולא פליגי כלומר מר מודה ליה בגיטין ומה (מר?) מודה ליה במציאה, וכי האי גוונא איכא טובא " Although the Gemara, presents versions that they do in fact argue (albeit agreeing in one case). Nevertheless, this seems to be the final אי בעית אימא conclusion of the Gemara that there is no argument at all, and each statement was not said סתם but rather in a specific context.

This "reconciliation" is made even though

  • both halachos are quoted in absolute terms (without any reference or hint to being limited specifically to cases of acquiring a get or lost object) - thus it would seem that these statements/rulings were taken (and passed on) out of context.
  • making this reconciliation is not a stringency to cover all basis, as by stating that Reish Lakish (who said that אין לה חצר) is referring specifically to a lost object (see Rashi) but in regards to get would agree to Rebbi Yochanan that יש לה חצר - we're considering her divorced and permitted to other men. Whereas the simple understanding of Reish Lakish, is that in all cases חצר does not acquire for her, and as such the get was never given to her, and she is not permitted to other men.

The Halichos Olam, concludes, that not only is this a common occurrence (as quoted above) but moreso this is the preferred approach

וכל היכא דאשפר לומר כן ושלא לעשות פלוגתא בין החכמים שפיר דמי

So at least as far back as 1490 (date of publication of the sefer) this is the preferred approach. And of course much further back, as he brought only one example from the Gemara, as he says there is many more. Anyone who learns Gemara, has even come across the lengths that the Gemara will go to try to find some reconciliation, even if it essentially relegates one of the opinions to referring specifically to a very far fetched/ i.e. limited case which rarely ever occurs.

So back to the question, WHY?

  • if it seems abundantly clear that different people have different ways of looking that things
  • and we see tons of cases where (there is no choice but to accept) that there is debate.
  • And we (the Gemara) even received the mesorah from the Tannaim (via the Mishnayos) that continually states machlokes.
  • And we (the Gemara) has admitted that now we live in a time of ריבוי מחלוקת (Sanhedrin 88b, Sotah 47b)

If so, when we encounter a case which is CLEARLY stated as 2 separate opinions - Why try to "force" the issue and create cases that aren't stated and qualify statements which were given (over) in absolute terms?

It's not like doing so will restore a situation of a single homogeneous state where there is a single view/shittah on everything.

More so, doing so could have a steep cost - as wouldn't these qualifications that are introduced be distorting the true intention, literally inserting something that the author never said?

  • 2
    Well asked. Brief part of a response: A large part of our learning is trying to figure out foundations. We assume that the earlier generation understood the Torah and its foundations more clearly; we aren't trying to figure it out from first principles, we are trying to sort out (reverse-engineer) what they are telling us about it. We do this with Tanaim, Amoraim, and even Rishonim. Since we think that way, it makes sense to assume that they agree on the basics and are arguing on the details. – MichoelR May 10 at 16:01
  • It's worth mentioning that the Rambam in his Hakdamah to Peirush Hamishnah says a similar version of this principle: machlokos are usually on small details, not on the main issues that were generally well-understood. – MichoelR May 10 at 16:11
  • It seems like you've answered your own question. There are lots of reasons to minimize machloket. Just because you don't find certain instances compelling is not a question on the principle. We don't actually eliminate every dispute ever. – Double AA May 10 at 16:11
  • Isn't this (somewhat) similar to living during the period where (due to עת לעשות) writing Oral Torah was allowed and every time you encounter a written sefer which appears to be stating a thought on the Oral Torah, to then come up with some qualification to say that really it wasn't talking about the Oral Torah, but rather about ... i.e. we live in a period where it's prevalent, so when confronted with what is another instance, why force the issue? – Chaim May 10 at 16:29
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    MichoelR - I appreciate the reverse-engineering point. And (together with a "Steady-state" assumption) the dangers in assuming that if there is machlokes now, then there must have been machlokes from the beginning (or near to it) and our mesorah is tainted. However, in this case, as the Gemara states there was a point-in-time change. However, even according to the Rambam (Beginning with) the talmidim of Hillel and Shammai things changes and machlokes proliferated - thus it's not reverse (or any) engineering to think that this new reality should cause a change in how we view machlokes – Chaim May 10 at 17:38

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