In general, I cannot say borei pri hagafen on behalf of another, if I'm not also drinking wine and making the blessing for myself as well. (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 213:2)

One exception to this rule is the shabbat morning kiddush (Rema to Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 273:4). There I can say borei pri hagafen to allow someone to fulfill his obligation of kiddush, even if I am not drinking anything.

What happens if there are two other people present on shabbat morning who both wish to drink wine, but one has already fulfilled kiddush?

I don't want to drink wine, but I can say borei pri hagafen on behalf of the person who has not yet fulfilled kiddush. Can the second person, who has already fulfilled kiddush, use my blessing for the wine he wishes to drink now?

  • Your question assumes if you aren't drinking and the person is already yotzei if you make the bracha anyways the other person can't drink. Is that so? Maybe it's forbidden to make the blessing, but if they do, it works. Then you're question doesn't start. Not sure...
    – robev
    Feb 12, 2020 at 18:45
  • @robev That does happen to be true in general (see MB 213:15) but I’m not sure why you think that that’s necessary for this question to start. Could be even if it would work bediavad in that case (unlike the MB) still lechatchilah in my case he should not attempt to be yotzei along with the guy who is hearing kiddush
    – Joel K
    Feb 12, 2020 at 18:49
  • I thought you were asking bedieved. You're asking lechatchila? Maybe make that more clear :-)
    – robev
    Feb 12, 2020 at 23:24

1 Answer 1


There is a similar case in the Gemara (Berachos 48) regarding Shimon ben Shetach and King Yannai. It seems from that using the principle of arvus (the principle that allows me to bless on behalf of someone else even when I am not blessing for myself), Shimon ben Shetach would have been able to discharge the obligation of Yannai and his wife.

The Tzlach (Berachos 20) attempted to prove from here that arvus applies even to women (at the very least, from a man to a woman), which is contrary to his understanding of a Rosh who seems to posit that women are excluded from arvus.

The Tzlach refutes his own proof with the following answer:

ואולי כיון שעכ"פ אכלו ינאי וחביריו כדי שביעה ונתחייבו מן התורה, ושמעון בן שטח הוא ערב דכל ישראל ערבים זה בזה, שוב נקרא שמעון בן שטח ג"כ מחוייב מן התורה ומוציא את הנשים אף שאינו ערב בעדם דאתי דאורייתא ומפיק דאורייתא

In summary, the Tzlach suggests that as long as the principle of arvus is activated on behalf of one person [in that context, for Yannai], even women (who do not have arvus on their own accord) can be discharged by listening to this blessing. (See also Shu"t R' Akiva Eiger #7, where R' Shlomo Eiger suggests the same idea)

Similarly, once arvus can be applied to this blessing for the listener who is fulfilling his obligation of Kiddush, anyone else can join along.

(The Tzlach himself seems to disregard this logic in a different piece (Berachos 48), and IIRC there is a proof that R' Akiva Eiger did not agree with this.)


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