The gemarra often employs the different types of derashos/hermeneutics such as kal vachomer/a fortiori arguments and hekesh/juxtaposition of phrases or terms. Also often, is these derashos are rejected due to some flaw, known as a pircha. For example, a law can't be derived from one verse to another through a hekesh because there's some special reason the first verse should have the law, which doesn't apply to the second verse.

Rabbi Yosef Tzvi Salant in Be'er Yosef suggests that when a pircha is introduced, the derasha isn't totally rejected. It remains a doubt, and in fact it could still prove true, if some later evidence appears that it's true.

I was wondering if this is his own insight, or is there an earlier source for such an idea, or is this not even a novelty, but the basic understanding of derashos/pirchos.

  • How is this practically different from saying that when a derasha is refuted we don’t know the law? – Alex Oct 20 at 18:02
  • @Alex I don't know about practical difference, but it will affect if you can answer his question with the answer he gives in the link :-) – robev Oct 20 at 18:10
  • @Alex I put emphasis on the fact that it's doubtfully true, as opposed to definitely not true – robev Oct 20 at 18:15
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    Slightly similar Yerushalmi sheviis 1.1 – Dr. Shmuel Oct 20 at 19:23
  • It sounds just like a logical point. If you reject a drasha, it doesn't tell you anything about the din. It doesn't logically prove that the din derived by the drasha is not true. – Daniel Oct 20 at 21:46

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