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And I say that this matter was not given to be researched and investigated until the coming of the Messiah.

(My translation)

Furthermore, one might perhaps also say: "Inasmuch as God knows what is to be before it happens, He must also know that man will rebel against Him. But in that case it would be impossible for man not to rebel, since otherwise what God foreknows would not be realized." The resolution of this doubt, however, is more obvious even than that of the first one. It need not be pointed out that the person who makes the above-mentioned assertion is really unable to prove that the Creator's foreknowledge of things is the cause of their coming into being. His assertion is, therefore, nothing else than an erroneous assumption or deliberate invention.

Its untenability is made clear by the realization that if God's foreknowledge of anything could be the cause of its coming into being, then all things would have to be eternal, having existed always since God has always known of them. What we profess, therefore, is that God has a knowledge of things as they are actually constituted. He also knows before anything happens to them that it will happen. Furthermore He is cognizant of what man's choice will be before man makes it.

Should it be asked, therefore: "But if God foreknows that a human being will speak, is it conceivable that he should remain silent?" We would answer, simply that, if a human being decided instead of speaking to be silent, we would merely modify our original assumption by saying that God knows that that human being will be silent. It would not be proper to assume that God knows that that person will speak, because what God foreknows is the final denouement of man's activity as it turns out after all his planning, anticipations, and delays. It is that very thing that God knows, as Scripture says: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man (Ps. 94:11), and also For I know their imagination how they do even now (Deut. 31:21).

(Rosenblatt translation, p. 191)

R. Samuel b. R. Isaac said: When Resh Lakish began to expound [the subject of] Sotah, he spoke thus: They only pair a woman with a man according to his deeds; as it is said: For the sceptre of wickedness shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Johanan: It is as difficult to pair them as was the division of the Red Sea; as it is said: God setteth the solitary in families: He bringeth out the prisoners into prosperity! But it is not so; for Rab Judah has said in the name of Rab: Forty days before the creation of a child, a Bath Kol issues forth and proclaims, The daughter of A is for B; the house of C is for D; the field of E is for F! — There is no contradiction, the latter dictum referring to a first marriage and the former to a second marriage.

(Soncino translation)

Do they in fact pair them up according to wickedness and merit? But before their formation, when his wickedness and meritoriousness are not known, they announce his match. And if you'll ask that everything is revealed before God, [the answer is that] everything is in the hands of Heaven except for fear of Heaven. As is stated in Tractate Niddah: "the angel appointed over pregnancy takes a drop and brings it before the Omnipresent and says before Him, 'what will be with this drop? Strong or weak? Wise or foolish? Rich or poor?'" But he does not say to Him 'righteous or wicked', since that is not in the hands of Heaven.

(My translation)

And so to with regard to knowledge. And with this I answer the question of many and great [people], see Rambam Laws of Repentance Chapter Five.

(My translation)

Everything is seen, and permission is given.

(My translation)

All that man does in his private chambers is seen and revealed before the Holy One Blessed Be He.

(My translation)

The School of R. Ishmael taught: 'If any man [hanofel] fall from thence': this man was predestined to fall since the six days of Creation, for lo! he has not [yet] fallen, and the Writ [already] calls him nofel [a faller]. But reward [zekut] is brought about through a person of merit [zakkai], and punishment [hobah] through a person of guilt.

(Soncino translation)

As it is written (Isaiah 41:4), He that called the generations from the beginning. For it is revealed before Him the generations and their actions and their punishments.

(My translation)

'There have been long controversies among the sages about how to reconcile predetermination with divine justice. Some of them said that all human actions are performed with man's free choice, ability, and power, that God entrusted man with this power and gave him dominion over his actions, so that He has nothing to do with them, and man himself earns either his reward or his punishment.

'Others attributed all the actions of men and the other creatures to the Creator, and claimed that every act performed in this world, either by man or by creatures not endowed with speech, is done only by permission of the Creator, by His decree and power and His rule. They said that nothing escapes Him or is overlooked by Him, even something as tiny as a hair.

`When these sages were asked about reward and punishment, they said that the form of reward and punishment is something of which we are ignorant, as we are of how it is distributed. God is just and does no evil. His promise of reward and punishment is true. It never fails. But our minds are too weak to grasp the meaning of His wisdom, and His justice and His grace are too clear and too manifest for us to suspect His judgments. There is no God but Him.

`Still others decided to believe in both schools, that is, to believe in both divine justice and in predetermination, claiming that whoever examines these matters too closely cannot escape sin and failure, no matter how he does it. They said, "The right way is to act in the belief that man's actions are entrusted to him, so that he earns reward or punishment, and to try to do everything that may benefit us before God both in this world and the next. On the other hand, we should rely on Him with the submission of those who know that all actions, movements, benefits, and misfortunes lie under God's rule and power and depend on His permission and decree, decisive argument against man, but man has no argument against his Creator."

'This is the closest way to deliverance of all those mentioned above, for it is right and just that we admit our ignorance of this aspect of the Creator's wisdom, because our minds are weak and our discrimination short. Indeed, there is some benefit in our ignorance; this is why it was hidden from us. Were it to our advantage to know this secret, the Creator would have revealed it to us.

(Mansoor translation, p. 210-211)

There is still another objection, viz. that these matters are outside the divine omniscience, because the absolutely potential is naturally an unknown quantity. The Mutakallims considered this matter in detail, with the result that the divine knowledge of the potential is but casual, and that the knowledge of a thing is neither the cause of its coming into existence, nor of its disappearance therefrom. There is, withal, a possibility of existence and non-existence. For the knowledge of events to come is not the cause of their existence, just as is the case with the knowledge of things which have been. This is but a proof that the knowledge belongs to God, or to the angels, or the prophets, or the priests. If this knowledge were the cause of the existence of a thing, many people would be placed in paradise solely for the sake of the divine knowledge that they are pious, even if they have done no pious act. Others would be in Gehenna, because God knows them to be wicked without their having committed a sin. Man should also be satisfied without having eaten, because he knows that he is accustomed to be satisfied at certain times.

(Hirschfeld translation, p. 282)

We already made known to you in the first book that just as God, may He be exalted, created things and gave to them certain necessary attributes like rationality to man — because when one is a man he is rational in all respects, that is, [he is] internally rational and he can conceive — and just as He created things and gave to them impossible attributes like rationality to a stone, so God created things and gave to them certain possible attributes. This is no deficiency in His knowledge, may He be exalted, because there are two kinds of possibility. [One kind of] possibility is possibility with respect to ignorance, an example of which is whether the king of Babylonia died today or is alive. [The reason that it is a possibility is] because we, the men of Spain, do not know this [state of affairs]. Rather, both alternatives are equal to us. This is because of our ignorance of what is remote from us. But since [this] matter in itself is not possible, of necessity one of the alternatives is correct, and God, may He be exalted, knows in [cases] like this that one of the alternatives is necessary as it is in itself. For example, [He knows] whether there will be an eclipse this month. [The reason for this is] that this [event] is possible to those who are ignorant of astronomy and the equinox of the stars, but in itself one of the alternatives is necessary, and God, may He be exalted, knows the necessary alternative. God already made this known to the masters of astronomy and equinoxes. To them it is not a possibility as it is a possibility to the masses. All the more so would it [not] be to God a possibility, because this kind of possibility, which is [a possibility] with respect to ignorance, does not occur to God, may He be blessed and exalted.

The second [kind of] possibility is [that] which is possible because God, may He be exalted, gave it possibility. He created it [as] a thing that [can] bear one or the other of two contrary attributes. How a possibility like this occurs or [does] not [occur] is not remote from God's knowledge, may He be exalted. [In both cases] He, may He be exalted, created that possibility. If a sophist would be sophistical and say, 'Is God, may He be exalted, ignorant of the end of the matter?' we [would] say [in response that] this is not ignorance. The desire of one who says this is to reverse all of the attributes. For example, [he wants to say] that He gives to eclipses either necessity or impossibility in all respects, and [he claims that] God did not create anything that has a possible attribute or its contrary. By this [kind of reasoning would follow] the destruction of the world and the corruption of civilization in this world as well as life in the world to come. [The reason for this is] that it [would be] vanity for a man to plow and to build buildings and to plant plants and to subjugate beasts and to increase acts of mercy and to choose weapons with which to fight, since what will happen already is decreed. Similarly, it [would be] vanity to worship God, may He be exalted, since prosperity or its opposite already is decreed. The matter is clear that the truth is the opposite of this. [The reason for this is] that God created contingents [that are] possible and He knows the contingents such as eclipses. [The reason for] this is that all of their causes are not from Him by a primary intention. Rather, some of them are from Him, may He be exalted, by a primary intention, and this is by His knowledge of all of their attributes, which [renders] necessary for them what is necessary and [renders] impossible for them what is impossible. And some of them are entrusted to nature by the will of God, 4 may He be exalted, so that they benefit him who properly uses them and they harm him who uses them in [a way that is] less or more than what is proper. God, may He be exalted, already decreed that there be causes in this way.

(Samuelson translation p. 248-249)

One might ask: Since The Holy One, blessed be He, knows everything that will occur before it comes to pass, does He or does He not know whether a person will be righteous or wicked?

If He knows that he will be righteous, [it appears] impossible for him not to be righteous. However, if one would say that despite His knowledge that he would be righteous, it is possible for him to be wicked, then His knowledge would be incomplete.

Know that the resolution to this question [can be described as]: "Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." Many great and fundamental principles and lofty concepts are dependent upon it. However, the statements that I will make must be known and understood [as a basis for the comprehension of this matter].

As explained in the second chapter of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, The Holy One, blessed be He, does not know with a knowledge that is external from Him as do men, whose knowledge and selves are two [different entities]. Rather, He, may His name be praised, and His knowledge are one.

Human knowledge cannot comprehend this concept in its entirety for just as it is beyond the potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator, as [Exodus 33:20] states: "No man will perceive, Me and live," so, too, it is beyond man's potential to comprehend and conceive the Creator's knowledge. This was the intent of the prophet's [Isaiah 55:8] statements: "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways, My ways."

Accordingly, we do not have the potential to conceive how The Holy One, blessed be He, knows all the creations and their deeds. However, this is known without any doubt: That man's actions are in his [own] hands and The Holy One, blessed be He, does not lead him [in a particular direction] or decree that he do anything.

This matter is known, not only as a tradition of faith, but also, through clear proofs from the words of wisdom. Consequently, the prophets taught that a person is judged for his deeds, according to his deeds - whether good or bad. This is a fundamental principle on which is dependent all the words of prophecy.

(Touger translation)

This author did not act in the way of the wise men, for a person does not begin a matter if he does not know how to complete it. But he began with difficult questions, and left the matter in difficulty and returned them [the readers] to faith. And it would have been better for him to leave the matter in the simpleness of the simple ones and not awaken their hearts and leave their minds in doubt, where perhaps a [bad] thought will come in their hearts for a moment about this. And even though there is no complete answer for this, it would have been good to provide a partial answer and say:

If the righteousness and wickedness of a person were dependent on the decree of God, we would say that His knowledge is His decree and we would have the very difficult question. But now that God has removed this dominion from His hand and given it to the hand of man himself, His knowledge is not a decree; rather, it is like the knowledge of the astrologers who know from another source what the ways of this person will be. And it is known that all happenings of man, small or big, God gave over to the power of the constellations, but He gave him intellect to give him the strength to escape from under [the influence of] the constellations. And that is the power given to man to be good or evil, while God knows the power of the constellations and its moments (?) whether the intellect has the power to let him escape from its [the constellations] hand or not, and this knowledge is not a decree. And all of this is not sufficient [to fully answer the question].

(My translation)

The sixteenth lesson is in ideas. And it is to teach us something amazing of God's knowledge of things, which was hidden from all [my] predecessors whose words have reached us. And it is that that which God may He be exalted knows of actions in this low world is independent of what man [actually] does. That is that He knows the actions of people that are fitting according to what was prepared for them from the day of their creation, based on the celestial causes that God may He be exalted placed as guidance over the human species. [However,] human choice rules over this arrangement of their actions based on the celestial causes. And it is therefore possible that what people actually do is different from what God may He be exalted knew [they would do] based on the arrangement of their actions. And this is because He knows their actions from the side in which knowledge of them is possible, and that is the side in which they are arranged and quantified. But on the side in which they are contingent there can be no knowledge, for if we suppose that knowledge of them is possible then their contingency cannot be upheld. And therefore it says metaphorically that God may He be exalted saw whether the people of Sodom and Gomorrah actually did the evil that He knew from them, because it is possible that what they had done was different from what God may He be exalted knew from them. And we have explained this topic of God's knowledge of things in Book III of Wars of the Lord. And we explained there that this view is necessary on the basis of philosophy as well as on the basis of Torah.

(My translation)

And I say that this matter was not given to be researched and investigated until the coming of the Messiah.

(My translation)

Furthermore, one might perhaps also say: "Inasmuch as God knows what is to be before it happens, He must also know that man will rebel against Him. But in that case it would be impossible for man not to rebel, since otherwise what God foreknows would not be realized." The resolution of this doubt, however, is more obvious even than that of the first one. It need not be pointed out that the person who makes the above-mentioned assertion is really unable to prove that the Creator's foreknowledge of things is the cause of their coming into being. His assertion is, therefore, nothing else than an erroneous assumption or deliberate invention.

Its untenability is made clear by the realization that if God's foreknowledge of anything could be the cause of its coming into being, then all things would have to be eternal, having existed always since God has always known of them. What we profess, therefore, is that God has a knowledge of things as they are actually constituted. He also knows before anything happens to them that it will happen. Furthermore He is cognizant of what man's choice will be before man makes it.

Should it be asked, therefore: "But if God foreknows that a human being will speak, is it conceivable that he should remain silent?" We would answer, simply that, if a human being decided instead of speaking to be silent, we would merely modify our original assumption by saying that God knows that that human being will be silent. It would not be proper to assume that God knows that that person will speak, because what God foreknows is the final denouement of man's activity as it turns out after all his planning, anticipations, and delays. It is that very thing that God knows, as Scripture says: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man (Ps. 94:11), and also For I know their imagination how they do even now (Deut. 31:21).

(Rosenblatt translation, p. 191)

R. Samuel b. R. Isaac said: When Resh Lakish began to expound [the subject of] Sotah, he spoke thus: They only pair a woman with a man according to his deeds; as it is said: For the sceptre of wickedness shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Johanan: It is as difficult to pair them as was the division of the Red Sea; as it is said: God setteth the solitary in families: He bringeth out the prisoners into prosperity! But it is not so; for Rab Judah has said in the name of Rab: Forty days before the creation of a child, a Bath Kol issues forth and proclaims, The daughter of A is for B; the house of C is for D; the field of E is for F! — There is no contradiction, the latter dictum referring to a first marriage and the former to a second marriage.

(Soncino translation)

Do they in fact pair them up according to wickedness and merit? But before their formation, when his wickedness and meritoriousness are not known, they announce his match. And if you'll ask that everything is revealed before God, [the answer is that] everything is in the hands of Heaven except for fear of Heaven. As is stated in Tractate Niddah: "the angel appointed over pregnancy takes a drop and brings it before the Omnipresent and says before Him, 'what will be with this drop? Strong or weak? Wise or foolish? Rich or poor?'" But he does not say to Him 'righteous or wicked', since that is not in the hands of Heaven.

(My translation)

And so to with regard to knowledge. And with this I answer the question of many and great [people], see Rambam Laws of Repentance Chapter Five.

(My translation)

Everything is seen, and permission is given.

(My translation)

All that man does in his private chambers is seen and revealed before the Holy One Blessed Be He.

(My translation)

The School of R. Ishmael taught: 'If any man [hanofel] fall from thence': this man was predestined to fall since the six days of Creation, for lo! he has not [yet] fallen, and the Writ [already] calls him nofel [a faller]. But reward [zekut] is brought about through a person of merit [zakkai], and punishment [hobah] through a person of guilt.

(Soncino translation)

As it is written (Isaiah 41:4), He that called the generations from the beginning. For it is revealed before Him the generations and their actions and their punishments.

(My translation)

'There have been long controversies among the sages about how to reconcile predetermination with divine justice. Some of them said that all human actions are performed with man's free choice, ability, and power, that God entrusted man with this power and gave him dominion over his actions, so that He has nothing to do with them, and man himself earns either his reward or his punishment.

'Others attributed all the actions of men and the other creatures to the Creator, and claimed that every act performed in this world, either by man or by creatures not endowed with speech, is done only by permission of the Creator, by His decree and power and His rule. They said that nothing escapes Him or is overlooked by Him, even something as tiny as a hair.

`When these sages were asked about reward and punishment, they said that the form of reward and punishment is something of which we are ignorant, as we are of how it is distributed. God is just and does no evil. His promise of reward and punishment is true. It never fails. But our minds are too weak to grasp the meaning of His wisdom, and His justice and His grace are too clear and too manifest for us to suspect His judgments. There is no God but Him.

`Still others decided to believe in both schools, that is, to believe in both divine justice and in predetermination, claiming that whoever examines these matters too closely cannot escape sin and failure, no matter how he does it. They said, "The right way is to act in the belief that man's actions are entrusted to him, so that he earns reward or punishment, and to try to do everything that may benefit us before God both in this world and the next. On the other hand, we should rely on Him with the submission of those who know that all actions, movements, benefits, and misfortunes lie under God's rule and power and depend on His permission and decree, decisive argument against man, but man has no argument against his Creator."

'This is the closest way to deliverance of all those mentioned above, for it is right and just that we admit our ignorance of this aspect of the Creator's wisdom, because our minds are weak and our discrimination short. Indeed, there is some benefit in our ignorance; this is why it was hidden from us. Were it to our advantage to know this secret, the Creator would have revealed it to us.

(Mansoor translation, p. 210-211)

There is still another objection, viz. that these matters are outside the divine omniscience, because the absolutely potential is naturally an unknown quantity. The Mutakallims considered this matter in detail, with the result that the divine knowledge of the potential is but casual, and that the knowledge of a thing is neither the cause of its coming into existence, nor of its disappearance therefrom. There is, withal, a possibility of existence and non-existence. For the knowledge of events to come is not the cause of their existence, just as is the case with the knowledge of things which have been. This is but a proof that the knowledge belongs to God, or to the angels, or the prophets, or the priests. If this knowledge were the cause of the existence of a thing, many people would be placed in paradise solely for the sake of the divine knowledge that they are pious, even if they have done no pious act. Others would be in Gehenna, because God knows them to be wicked without their having committed a sin. Man should also be satisfied without having eaten, because he knows that he is accustomed to be satisfied at certain times.

(Hirschfeld translation, p. 282)

We already made known to you in the first book that just as God, may He be exalted, created things and gave to them certain necessary attributes like rationality to man — because when one is a man he is rational in all respects, that is, [he is] internally rational and he can conceive — and just as He created things and gave to them impossible attributes like rationality to a stone, so God created things and gave to them certain possible attributes. This is no deficiency in His knowledge, may He be exalted, because there are two kinds of possibility. [One kind of] possibility is possibility with respect to ignorance, an example of which is whether the king of Babylonia died today or is alive. [The reason that it is a possibility is] because we, the men of Spain, do not know this [state of affairs]. Rather, both alternatives are equal to us. This is because of our ignorance of what is remote from us. But since [this] matter in itself is not possible, of necessity one of the alternatives is correct, and God, may He be exalted, knows in [cases] like this that one of the alternatives is necessary as it is in itself. For example, [He knows] whether there will be an eclipse this month. [The reason for this is] that this [event] is possible to those who are ignorant of astronomy and the equinox of the stars, but in itself one of the alternatives is necessary, and God, may He be exalted, knows the necessary alternative. God already made this known to the masters of astronomy and equinoxes. To them it is not a possibility as it is a possibility to the masses. All the more so would it [not] be to God a possibility, because this kind of possibility, which is [a possibility] with respect to ignorance, does not occur to God, may He be blessed and exalted.

The second [kind of] possibility is [that] which is possible because God, may He be exalted, gave it possibility. He created it [as] a thing that [can] bear one or the other of two contrary attributes. How a possibility like this occurs or [does] not [occur] is not remote from God's knowledge, may He be exalted. [In both cases] He, may He be exalted, created that possibility. If a sophist would be sophistical and say, 'Is God, may He be exalted, ignorant of the end of the matter?' we [would] say [in response that] this is not ignorance. The desire of one who says this is to reverse all of the attributes. For example, [he wants to say] that He gives to eclipses either necessity or impossibility in all respects, and [he claims that] God did not create anything that has a possible attribute or its contrary. By this [kind of reasoning would follow] the destruction of the world and the corruption of civilization in this world as well as life in the world to come. [The reason for this is] that it [would be] vanity for a man to plow and to build buildings and to plant plants and to subjugate beasts and to increase acts of mercy and to choose weapons with which to fight, since what will happen already is decreed. Similarly, it [would be] vanity to worship God, may He be exalted, since prosperity or its opposite already is decreed. The matter is clear that the truth is the opposite of this. [The reason for this is] that God created contingents [that are] possible and He knows the contingents such as eclipses. [The reason for] this is that all of their causes are not from Him by a primary intention. Rather, some of them are from Him, may He be exalted, by a primary intention, and this is by His knowledge of all of their attributes, which [renders] necessary for them what is necessary and [renders] impossible for them what is impossible. And some of them are entrusted to nature by the will of God, 4 may He be exalted, so that they benefit him who properly uses them and they harm him who uses them in [a way that is] less or more than what is proper. God, may He be exalted, already decreed that there be causes in this way.

(Samuelson translation p. 248-249)

One might ask: Since The Holy One, blessed be He, knows everything that will occur before it comes to pass, does He or does He not know whether a person will be righteous or wicked?

If He knows that he will be righteous, [it appears] impossible for him not to be righteous. However, if one would say that despite His knowledge that he would be righteous, it is possible for him to be wicked, then His knowledge would be incomplete.

Know that the resolution to this question [can be described as]: "Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." Many great and fundamental principles and lofty concepts are dependent upon it. However, the statements that I will make must be known and understood [as a basis for the comprehension of this matter].

As explained in the second chapter of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, The Holy One, blessed be He, does not know with a knowledge that is external from Him as do men, whose knowledge and selves are two [different entities]. Rather, He, may His name be praised, and His knowledge are one.

Human knowledge cannot comprehend this concept in its entirety for just as it is beyond the potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator, as [Exodus 33:20] states: "No man will perceive, Me and live," so, too, it is beyond man's potential to comprehend and conceive the Creator's knowledge. This was the intent of the prophet's [Isaiah 55:8] statements: "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways, My ways."

Accordingly, we do not have the potential to conceive how The Holy One, blessed be He, knows all the creations and their deeds. However, this is known without any doubt: That man's actions are in his [own] hands and The Holy One, blessed be He, does not lead him [in a particular direction] or decree that he do anything.

This matter is known, not only as a tradition of faith, but also, through clear proofs from the words of wisdom. Consequently, the prophets taught that a person is judged for his deeds, according to his deeds - whether good or bad. This is a fundamental principle on which is dependent all the words of prophecy.

(Touger translation)

This author did not act in the way of the wise men, for a person does not begin a matter if he does not know how to complete it. But he began with difficult questions, and left the matter in difficulty and returned them [the readers] to faith. And it would have been better for him to leave the matter in the simpleness of the simple ones and not awaken their hearts and leave their minds in doubt, where perhaps a [bad] thought will come in their hearts for a moment about this. And even though there is no complete answer for this, it would have been good to provide a partial answer and say:

If the righteousness and wickedness of a person were dependent on the decree of God, we would say that His knowledge is His decree and we would have the very difficult question. But now that God has removed this dominion from His hand and given it to the hand of man himself, His knowledge is not a decree; rather, it is like the knowledge of the astrologers who know from another source what the ways of this person will be. And it is known that all happenings of man, small or big, God gave over to the power of the constellations, but He gave him intellect to give him the strength to escape from under [the influence of] the constellations. And that is the power given to man to be good or evil, while God knows the power of the constellations and its moments (?) whether the intellect has the power to let him escape from its [the constellations] hand or not, and this knowledge is not a decree. And all of this is not sufficient [to fully answer the question].

(My translation)

The sixteenth lesson is in ideas. And it is to teach us something amazing of God's knowledge of things, which was hidden from all [my] predecessors whose words have reached us. And it is that that which God may He be exalted knows of actions in this low world is independent of what man [actually] does. That is that He knows the actions of people that are fitting according to what was prepared for them from the day of their creation, based on the celestial causes that God may He be exalted placed as guidance over the human species. [However,] human choice rules over this arrangement of their actions based on the celestial causes. And it is therefore possible that what people actually do is different from what God may He be exalted knew [they would do] based on the arrangement of their actions. And this is because He knows their actions from the side in which knowledge of them is possible, and that is the side in which they are arranged and quantified. But on the side in which they are contingent there can be no knowledge, for if we suppose that knowledge of them is possible then their contingency cannot be upheld. And therefore it says metaphorically that God may He be exalted saw whether the people of Sodom and Gomorrah actually did the evil that He knew from them, because it is possible that what they had done was different from what God may He be exalted knew from them. And we have explained this topic of God's knowledge of things in Book III of Wars of the Lord. And we explained there that this view is necessary on the basis of philosophy as well as on the basis of Torah.

(My translation)

And I say that this matter was not given to be researched and investigated until the coming of the Messiah.

(My translation)

Furthermore, one might perhaps also say: "Inasmuch as God knows what is to be before it happens, He must also know that man will rebel against Him. But in that case it would be impossible for man not to rebel, since otherwise what God foreknows would not be realized." The resolution of this doubt, however, is more obvious even than that of the first one. It need not be pointed out that the person who makes the above-mentioned assertion is really unable to prove that the Creator's foreknowledge of things is the cause of their coming into being. His assertion is, therefore, nothing else than an erroneous assumption or deliberate invention.

Its untenability is made clear by the realization that if God's foreknowledge of anything could be the cause of its coming into being, then all things would have to be eternal, having existed always since God has always known of them. What we profess, therefore, is that God has a knowledge of things as they are actually constituted. He also knows before anything happens to them that it will happen. Furthermore He is cognizant of what man's choice will be before man makes it.

Should it be asked, therefore: "But if God foreknows that a human being will speak, is it conceivable that he should remain silent?" We would answer, simply that, if a human being decided instead of speaking to be silent, we would merely modify our original assumption by saying that God knows that that human being will be silent. It would not be proper to assume that God knows that that person will speak, because what God foreknows is the final denouement of man's activity as it turns out after all his planning, anticipations, and delays. It is that very thing that God knows, as Scripture says: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man (Ps. 94:11), and also For I know their imagination how they do even now (Deut. 31:21).

(Rosenblatt translation, p. 191)

R. Samuel b. R. Isaac said: When Resh Lakish began to expound [the subject of] Sotah, he spoke thus: They only pair a woman with a man according to his deeds; as it is said: For the sceptre of wickedness shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Johanan: It is as difficult to pair them as was the division of the Red Sea; as it is said: God setteth the solitary in families: He bringeth out the prisoners into prosperity! But it is not so; for Rab Judah has said in the name of Rab: Forty days before the creation of a child, a Bath Kol issues forth and proclaims, The daughter of A is for B; the house of C is for D; the field of E is for F! — There is no contradiction, the latter dictum referring to a first marriage and the former to a second marriage.

(Soncino translation)

Do they in fact pair them up according to wickedness and merit? But before their formation, when his wickedness and meritoriousness are not known, they announce his match. And if you'll ask that everything is revealed before God, [the answer is that] everything is in the hands of Heaven except for fear of Heaven. As is stated in Tractate Niddah: "the angel appointed over pregnancy takes a drop and brings it before the Omnipresent and says before Him, 'what will be with this drop? Strong or weak? Wise or foolish? Rich or poor?'" But he does not say to Him 'righteous or wicked', since that is not in the hands of Heaven.

(My translation)

And so to with regard to knowledge. And with this I answer the question of many and great [people], see Rambam Laws of Repentance Chapter Five.

(My translation)

Everything is seen, and permission is given.

(My translation)

All that man does in his private chambers is seen and revealed before the Holy One Blessed Be He.

(My translation)

The School of R. Ishmael taught: 'If any man [hanofel] fall from thence': this man was predestined to fall since the six days of Creation, for lo! he has not [yet] fallen, and the Writ [already] calls him nofel [a faller]. But reward [zekut] is brought about through a person of merit [zakkai], and punishment [hobah] through a person of guilt.

(Soncino translation)

As it is written (Isaiah 41:4), He that called the generations from the beginning. For it is revealed before Him the generations and their actions and their punishments.

(My translation)

'There have been long controversies among the sages about how to reconcile predetermination with divine justice. Some of them said that all human actions are performed with man's free choice, ability, and power, that God entrusted man with this power and gave him dominion over his actions, so that He has nothing to do with them, and man himself earns either his reward or his punishment.

'Others attributed all the actions of men and the other creatures to the Creator, and claimed that every act performed in this world, either by man or by creatures not endowed with speech, is done only by permission of the Creator, by His decree and power and His rule. They said that nothing escapes Him or is overlooked by Him, even something as tiny as a hair.

`When these sages were asked about reward and punishment, they said that the form of reward and punishment is something of which we are ignorant, as we are of how it is distributed. God is just and does no evil. His promise of reward and punishment is true. It never fails. But our minds are too weak to grasp the meaning of His wisdom, and His justice and His grace are too clear and too manifest for us to suspect His judgments. There is no God but Him.

`Still others decided to believe in both schools, that is, to believe in both divine justice and in predetermination, claiming that whoever examines these matters too closely cannot escape sin and failure, no matter how he does it. They said, "The right way is to act in the belief that man's actions are entrusted to him, so that he earns reward or punishment, and to try to do everything that may benefit us before God both in this world and the next. On the other hand, we should rely on Him with the submission of those who know that all actions, movements, benefits, and misfortunes lie under God's rule and power and depend on His permission and decree, decisive argument against man, but man has no argument against his Creator."

'This is the closest way to deliverance of all those mentioned above, for it is right and just that we admit our ignorance of this aspect of the Creator's wisdom, because our minds are weak and our discrimination short. Indeed, there is some benefit in our ignorance; this is why it was hidden from us. Were it to our advantage to know this secret, the Creator would have revealed it to us.

(Mansoor translation, p. 210-211)

There is still another objection, viz. that these matters are outside the divine omniscience, because the absolutely potential is naturally an unknown quantity. The Mutakallims considered this matter in detail, with the result that the divine knowledge of the potential is but casual, and that the knowledge of a thing is neither the cause of its coming into existence, nor of its disappearance therefrom. There is, withal, a possibility of existence and non-existence. For the knowledge of events to come is not the cause of their existence, just as is the case with the knowledge of things which have been. This is but a proof that the knowledge belongs to God, or to the angels, or the prophets, or the priests. If this knowledge were the cause of the existence of a thing, many people would be placed in paradise solely for the sake of the divine knowledge that they are pious, even if they have done no pious act. Others would be in Gehenna, because God knows them to be wicked without their having committed a sin. Man should also be satisfied without having eaten, because he knows that he is accustomed to be satisfied at certain times.

(Hirschfeld translation, p. 282)

We already made known to you in the first book that just as God, may He be exalted, created things and gave to them certain necessary attributes like rationality to man — because when one is a man he is rational in all respects, that is, [he is] internally rational and he can conceive — and just as He created things and gave to them impossible attributes like rationality to a stone, so God created things and gave to them certain possible attributes. This is no deficiency in His knowledge, may He be exalted, because there are two kinds of possibility. [One kind of] possibility is possibility with respect to ignorance, an example of which is whether the king of Babylonia died today or is alive. [The reason that it is a possibility is] because we, the men of Spain, do not know this [state of affairs]. Rather, both alternatives are equal to us. This is because of our ignorance of what is remote from us. But since [this] matter in itself is not possible, of necessity one of the alternatives is correct, and God, may He be exalted, knows in [cases] like this that one of the alternatives is necessary as it is in itself. For example, [He knows] whether there will be an eclipse this month. [The reason for this is] that this [event] is possible to those who are ignorant of astronomy and the equinox of the stars, but in itself one of the alternatives is necessary, and God, may He be exalted, knows the necessary alternative. God already made this known to the masters of astronomy and equinoxes. To them it is not a possibility as it is a possibility to the masses. All the more so would it [not] be to God a possibility, because this kind of possibility, which is [a possibility] with respect to ignorance, does not occur to God, may He be blessed and exalted.

The second [kind of] possibility is [that] which is possible because God, may He be exalted, gave it possibility. He created it [as] a thing that [can] bear one or the other of two contrary attributes. How a possibility like this occurs or [does] not [occur] is not remote from God's knowledge, may He be exalted. [In both cases] He, may He be exalted, created that possibility. If a sophist would be sophistical and say, 'Is God, may He be exalted, ignorant of the end of the matter?' we [would] say [in response that] this is not ignorance. The desire of one who says this is to reverse all of the attributes. For example, [he wants to say] that He gives to eclipses either necessity or impossibility in all respects, and [he claims that] God did not create anything that has a possible attribute or its contrary. By this [kind of reasoning would follow] the destruction of the world and the corruption of civilization in this world as well as life in the world to come. [The reason for this is] that it [would be] vanity for a man to plow and to build buildings and to plant plants and to subjugate beasts and to increase acts of mercy and to choose weapons with which to fight, since what will happen already is decreed. Similarly, it [would be] vanity to worship God, may He be exalted, since prosperity or its opposite already is decreed. The matter is clear that the truth is the opposite of this. [The reason for this is] that God created contingents [that are] possible and He knows the contingents such as eclipses. [The reason for] this is that all of their causes are not from Him by a primary intention. Rather, some of them are from Him, may He be exalted, by a primary intention, and this is by His knowledge of all of their attributes, which [renders] necessary for them what is necessary and [renders] impossible for them what is impossible. And some of them are entrusted to nature by the will of God, 4 may He be exalted, so that they benefit him who properly uses them and they harm him who uses them in [a way that is] less or more than what is proper. God, may He be exalted, already decreed that there be causes in this way.

(Samuelson translation p. 248-249)

One might ask: Since The Holy One, blessed be He, knows everything that will occur before it comes to pass, does He or does He not know whether a person will be righteous or wicked?

If He knows that he will be righteous, [it appears] impossible for him not to be righteous. However, if one would say that despite His knowledge that he would be righteous, it is possible for him to be wicked, then His knowledge would be incomplete.

Know that the resolution to this question [can be described as]: "Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." Many great and fundamental principles and lofty concepts are dependent upon it. However, the statements that I will make must be known and understood [as a basis for the comprehension of this matter].

As explained in the second chapter of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, The Holy One, blessed be He, does not know with a knowledge that is external from Him as do men, whose knowledge and selves are two [different entities]. Rather, He, may His name be praised, and His knowledge are one.

Human knowledge cannot comprehend this concept in its entirety for just as it is beyond the potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator, as [Exodus 33:20] states: "No man will perceive, Me and live," so, too, it is beyond man's potential to comprehend and conceive the Creator's knowledge. This was the intent of the prophet's [Isaiah 55:8] statements: "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways, My ways."

Accordingly, we do not have the potential to conceive how The Holy One, blessed be He, knows all the creations and their deeds. However, this is known without any doubt: That man's actions are in his [own] hands and The Holy One, blessed be He, does not lead him [in a particular direction] or decree that he do anything.

This matter is known, not only as a tradition of faith, but also, through clear proofs from the words of wisdom. Consequently, the prophets taught that a person is judged for his deeds, according to his deeds - whether good or bad. This is a fundamental principle on which is dependent all the words of prophecy.

(Touger translation)

This author did not act in the way of the wise men, for a person does not begin a matter if he does not know how to complete it. But he began with difficult questions, and left the matter in difficulty and returned them [the readers] to faith. And it would have been better for him to leave the matter in the simpleness of the simple ones and not awaken their hearts and leave their minds in doubt, where perhaps a [bad] thought will come in their hearts for a moment about this. And even though there is no complete answer for this, it would have been good to provide a partial answer and say:

If the righteousness and wickedness of a person were dependent on the decree of God, we would say that His knowledge is His decree and we would have the very difficult question. But now that God has removed this dominion from His hand and given it to the hand of man himself, His knowledge is not a decree; rather, it is like the knowledge of the astrologers who know from another source what the ways of this person will be. And it is known that all happenings of man, small or big, God gave over to the power of the constellations, but He gave him intellect to give him the strength to escape from under [the influence of] the constellations. And that is the power given to man to be good or evil, while God knows the power of the constellations and its moments (?) whether the intellect has the power to let him escape from its [the constellations] hand or not, and this knowledge is not a decree. And all of this is not sufficient [to fully answer the question].

(My translation)

The sixteenth lesson is in ideas. And it is to teach us something amazing of God's knowledge of things, which was hidden from all [my] predecessors whose words have reached us. And it is that that which God may He be exalted knows of actions in this low world is independent of what man [actually] does. That is that He knows the actions of people that are fitting according to what was prepared for them from the day of their creation, based on the celestial causes that God may He be exalted placed as guidance over the human species. [However,] human choice rules over this arrangement of their actions based on the celestial causes. And it is therefore possible that what people actually do is different from what God may He be exalted knew [they would do] based on the arrangement of their actions. And this is because He knows their actions from the side in which knowledge of them is possible, and that is the side in which they are arranged and quantified. But on the side in which they are contingent there can be no knowledge, for if we suppose that knowledge of them is possible then their contingency cannot be upheld. And therefore it says metaphorically that God may He be exalted saw whether the people of Sodom and Gomorrah actually did the evil that He knew from them, because it is possible that what they had done was different from what God may He be exalted knew from them. And we have explained this topic of God's knowledge of things in Book III of Wars of the Lord. And we explained there that this view is necessary on the basis of philosophy as well as on the basis of Torah.

(My translation)

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(My translation)

Everything is seen, and permission is given.

(My translation)

All that man does in his private chambers is seen and revealed before the Holy One Blessed Be He.

(My translation)

For the continuation of this answer see this separate post.

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Alex

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Note: My answer ended up vastly exceeding the maximum character limit for a post, so I have split it into two parts. The first part follows here, while the second part can be found in a separate post.

Below I have tried to provide a survey of the different approaches of the rishonim to this contradiction. All the sources are from their own writings, not from secondary sources. None of the sources were written in English; where professional translations exist I have cited those (and indicated thus), and otherwise I have provided my own translations (also indicated). I have not provided the text in its original language, as I have already far exceeded the maximum post length.

Note that a lot of the sources are somewhat vague or not entirely clear with respect to the precise parameters of the resolution of the contradiction. I have done my best to provide brief summaries of what I think each one is saying; it is certainly possible that I have misunderstood them and therefore misrepresented them. Hopefully, the full citations will allow readers to judge for themselves what was actually meant.

To briefly summarize, as the content below is quite lengthy, there seems to be three types of resolutions:

Even though free will and Divine foreknowledge appear to be contradictory they are not actually mutually exclusive.
Free will and Divine foreknowledge are mutually exclusive, therefore the doctrine of free will must be rejected/modified in some way.
Free will and Divine foreknowledge are mutually exclusive, therefore the doctrine of Divine foreknowledge must be rejected/modified in some way.

Most of the sources (at least claim to) use the first approach, and indeed that seems to be the approach that has won out in contemporary Jewish thought, but a couple of sources do utilize the second or third approach.

It would perhaps be fitting to preface the below content with a comment of R. Issachar Eilenberg in his commentary to Sotah 2a in reference to this topic:

And I say that this matter was not given to be researched and investigated until the coming of the Messiah.

Now for the actual content, in chronological order:

R. Saadia Gaon

R. Saadia Gaon was the first rabbinic author to explicitly lay out the contradiction and attempt to address it, but it is not entirely clear what his answer is. It sounds like he is saying that God's knowledge doesn't force human action, because God's knowledge is itself a result of human action. That is to say that the person did not have to choose X because God knew the person would do X; rather, God knew that the person would choose X because the person actually chose X.

Emunot V'Deiot 4:5

Furthermore, one might perhaps also say: "Inasmuch as God knows what is to be before it happens, He must also know that man will rebel against Him. But in that case it would be impossible for man not to rebel, since otherwise what God foreknows would not be realized." The resolution of this doubt, however, is more obvious even than that of the first one. It need not be pointed out that the person who makes the above-mentioned assertion is really unable to prove that the Creator's foreknowledge of things is the cause of their coming into being. His assertion is, therefore, nothing else than an erroneous assumption or deliberate invention.

Its untenability is made clear by the realization that if God's foreknowledge of anything could be the cause of its coming into being, then all things would have to be eternal, having existed always since God has always known of them. What we profess, therefore, is that God has a knowledge of things as they are actually constituted. He also knows before anything happens to them that it will happen. Furthermore He is cognizant of what man's choice will be before man makes it.

Should it be asked, therefore: "But if God foreknows that a human being will speak, is it conceivable that he should remain silent?" We would answer, simply that, if a human being decided instead of speaking to be silent, we would merely modify our original assumption by saying that God knows that that human being will be silent. It would not be proper to assume that God knows that that person will speak, because what God foreknows is the final denouement of man's activity as it turns out after all his planning, anticipations, and delays. It is that very thing that God knows, as Scripture says: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man (Ps. 94:11), and also For I know their imagination how they do even now (Deut. 31:21).

(Rosenblatt translation, p. 191)

Rashi

While not meant as a philosophical discussion of this contradiction, Rashi has a comment that seems to relate to this. The Talmud in Sotah 2a states:

R. Samuel b. R. Isaac said: When Resh Lakish began to expound [the subject of] Sotah, he spoke thus: They only pair a woman with a man according to his deeds; as it is said: For the sceptre of wickedness shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous. Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Johanan: It is as difficult to pair them as was the division of the Red Sea; as it is said: God setteth the solitary in families: He bringeth out the prisoners into prosperity! But it is not so; for Rab Judah has said in the name of Rab: Forty days before the creation of a child, a Bath Kol issues forth and proclaims, The daughter of A is for B; the house of C is for D; the field of E is for F! — There is no contradiction, the latter dictum referring to a first marriage and the former to a second marriage.

(Soncino translation)

Commenting on the phrase "But it is not so", Rashi writes:

Do they in fact pair them up according to wickedness and merit? But before their formation, when his wickedness and meritoriousness are not known, they announce his match. And if you'll ask that everything is revealed before God, [the answer is that] everything is in the hands of Heaven except for fear of Heaven. As is stated in Tractate Niddah: "the angel appointed over pregnancy takes a drop and brings it before the Omnipresent and says before Him, 'what will be with this drop? Strong or weak? Wise or foolish? Rich or poor?'" But he does not say to Him 'righteous or wicked', since that is not in the hands of Heaven.

(My translation)

Here Rashi seems to be explaining the Talmud's objection as follows: How can Reish Lakish claim that a man's match is made dependent on his deeds, if his match is announced before his deeds are known. Rashi then addresses a possible question on this objection, namely that this is God we're talking about and God is omniscient. Rashi's answer to this objection seems to be that while God may know whether a person will be strong, smart, rich, etc. even He does not know what the person's deeds will be, since there is a rule that man's deeds are outside the control of Heaven and man has free choice to either do good or do bad.

The simplest explanation of this seems to be that man is able to have free will to do either good or bad, because God does not know in advance what man's actions will be. Indeed, this appears to be the understanding of the Ohel Moshe, who writes, commenting on Rashi's statement of "all is in the hands of Heaven except for fear of Heaven":

And so to with regard to knowledge. And with this I answer the question of many and great [people], see Rambam Laws of Repentance Chapter Five.

This citation is to where Rambam discusses the contradiction between foreknowledge and free will. Thus, the Ohel Moshe seems to be saying that he resolves this contradiction by following Rashi that man's deeds are excluded from God's control, even insofar as God's foreknowledge of them.

This is perhaps supported by Rashi's comments elsewhere. The Mishnah in Avot 3:16 states:

Everything is seen, and permission is given.

This statement has been taken by other commentators as the very embodiment of the contradiction under discussion: God foresees all human actions, yet humans still have free will. Rashi, however, writes the following in his commentary¹ to this statement:

All that man does in his private chambers is seen and revealed before the Holy One Blessed Be He.

It thus seems that rather than interpreting this in a temporal sense, Rashi interprets it in a spatial sense. That is to say, that it is not a warning that God knows what you will do even before you do it; it is a warning that God will know what you do no matter where you do it. This, again, fits with the idea of God not knowing what man's actions will be prior to their actualization.

On the other hand, commenting on a different Talmudic passage, Rashi indicates that God does know the future actions of man, though without saying anything about free will. The Talmud (Shabbat 32a) states:

The School of R. Ishmael taught: 'If any man [hanofel] fall from thence': this man was predestined to fall since the six days of Creation, for lo! he has not [yet] fallen, and the Writ [already] calls him nofel [a faller]. But reward [zekut] is brought about through a person of merit [zakkai], and punishment [hobah] through a person of guilt.

(Soncino translation)

Rashi, explaining "since the six days of Creation", writes:

As it is written (Isaiah 41:4), He that called the generations from the beginning. For it is revealed before Him the generations and their actions and their punishments.

(My translation)

Here Rashi seems to be explaining that God does know all of man's future actions.

R. Bahye Ibn Paquda

In the context of the clash between predetermination and Divine justice, R. Bahye Ibn Paquda seems to be most accepting of the view that maintains that we should act as if we have free will, though in reality everything is controlled by God.

Chovot Halevavot 3:8

'There have been long controversies among the sages about how to reconcile predetermination with divine justice. Some of them said that all human actions are performed with man's free choice, ability, and power, that God entrusted man with this power and gave him dominion over his actions, so that He has nothing to do with them, and man himself earns either his reward or his punishment.

'Others attributed all the actions of men and the other creatures to the Creator, and claimed that every act performed in this world, either by man or by creatures not endowed with speech, is done only by permission of the Creator, by His decree and power and His rule. They said that nothing escapes Him or is overlooked by Him, even something as tiny as a hair.

`When these sages were asked about reward and punishment, they said that the form of reward and punishment is something of which we are ignorant, as we are of how it is distributed. God is just and does no evil. His promise of reward and punishment is true. It never fails. But our minds are too weak to grasp the meaning of His wisdom, and His justice and His grace are too clear and too manifest for us to suspect His judgments. There is no God but Him.

`Still others decided to believe in both schools, that is, to believe in both divine justice and in predetermination, claiming that whoever examines these matters too closely cannot escape sin and failure, no matter how he does it. They said, "The right way is to act in the belief that man's actions are entrusted to him, so that he earns reward or punishment, and to try to do everything that may benefit us before God both in this world and the next. On the other hand, we should rely on Him with the submission of those who know that all actions, movements, benefits, and misfortunes lie under God's rule and power and depend on His permission and decree, decisive argument against man, but man has no argument against his Creator."

'This is the closest way to deliverance of all those mentioned above, for it is right and just that we admit our ignorance of this aspect of the Creator's wisdom, because our minds are weak and our discrimination short. Indeed, there is some benefit in our ignorance; this is why it was hidden from us. Were it to our advantage to know this secret, the Creator would have revealed it to us.

(Mansoor translation, p. 210-211)

R. Judah HaLevi

R. Judah HaLevi argues that God's knowledge does not cause human action, but is merely an awareness of what the human choices will be:

Kuzari 5:20

There is still another objection, viz. that these matters are outside the divine omniscience, because the absolutely potential is naturally an unknown quantity. The Mutakallims considered this matter in detail, with the result that the divine knowledge of the potential is but casual, and that the knowledge of a thing is neither the cause of its coming into existence, nor of its disappearance therefrom. There is, withal, a possibility of existence and non-existence. For the knowledge of events to come is not the cause of their existence, just as is the case with the knowledge of things which have been. This is but a proof that the knowledge belongs to God, or to the angels, or the prophets, or the priests. If this knowledge were the cause of the existence of a thing, many people would be placed in paradise solely for the sake of the divine knowledge that they are pious, even if they have done no pious act. Others would be in Gehenna, because God knows them to be wicked without their having committed a sin. Man should also be satisfied without having eaten, because he knows that he is accustomed to be satisfied at certain times.

(Hirschfeld translation, p. 282)

R. Abraham Ibn Daud

R. Abraham Ibn Daud distinguishes between two types of possibility. There are certain things where multiple outcomes are possible from our perspective, but only due to our ignorance. There is no inherent possibility of multiple outcomes since one out come is definitely true; we just don't know which one. In these cases, God who is not ignorant knows the true outcome. The other type of case is where multiple possible outcomes truly exist. God designed it this way because otherwise there would be no point of anything.

Emunah Haramah The Sixth Principle

We already made known to you in the first book that just as God, may He be exalted, created things and gave to them certain necessary attributes like rationality to man — because when one is a man he is rational in all respects, that is, [he is] internally rational and he can conceive — and just as He created things and gave to them impossible attributes like rationality to a stone, so God created things and gave to them certain possible attributes. This is no deficiency in His knowledge, may He be exalted, because there are two kinds of possibility. [One kind of] possibility is possibility with respect to ignorance, an example of which is whether the king of Babylonia died today or is alive. [The reason that it is a possibility is] because we, the men of Spain, do not know this [state of affairs]. Rather, both alternatives are equal to us. This is because of our ignorance of what is remote from us. But since [this] matter in itself is not possible, of necessity one of the alternatives is correct, and God, may He be exalted, knows in [cases] like this that one of the alternatives is necessary as it is in itself. For example, [He knows] whether there will be an eclipse this month. [The reason for this is] that this [event] is possible to those who are ignorant of astronomy and the equinox of the stars, but in itself one of the alternatives is necessary, and God, may He be exalted, knows the necessary alternative. God already made this known to the masters of astronomy and equinoxes. To them it is not a possibility as it is a possibility to the masses. All the more so would it [not] be to God a possibility, because this kind of possibility, which is [a possibility] with respect to ignorance, does not occur to God, may He be blessed and exalted.

The second [kind of] possibility is [that] which is possible because God, may He be exalted, gave it possibility. He created it [as] a thing that [can] bear one or the other of two contrary attributes. How a possibility like this occurs or [does] not [occur] is not remote from God's knowledge, may He be exalted. [In both cases] He, may He be exalted, created that possibility. If a sophist would be sophistical and say, 'Is God, may He be exalted, ignorant of the end of the matter?' we [would] say [in response that] this is not ignorance. The desire of one who says this is to reverse all of the attributes. For example, [he wants to say] that He gives to eclipses either necessity or impossibility in all respects, and [he claims that] God did not create anything that has a possible attribute or its contrary. By this [kind of reasoning would follow] the destruction of the world and the corruption of civilization in this world as well as life in the world to come. [The reason for this is] that it [would be] vanity for a man to plow and to build buildings and to plant plants and to subjugate beasts and to increase acts of mercy and to choose weapons with which to fight, since what will happen already is decreed. Similarly, it [would be] vanity to worship God, may He be exalted, since prosperity or its opposite already is decreed. The matter is clear that the truth is the opposite of this. [The reason for this is] that God created contingents [that are] possible and He knows the contingents such as eclipses. [The reason for] this is that all of their causes are not from Him by a primary intention. Rather, some of them are from Him, may He be exalted, by a primary intention, and this is by His knowledge of all of their attributes, which [renders] necessary for them what is necessary and [renders] impossible for them what is impossible. And some of them are entrusted to nature by the will of God, 4 may He be exalted, so that they benefit him who properly uses them and they harm him who uses them in [a way that is] less or more than what is proper. God, may He be exalted, already decreed that there be causes in this way.

(Samuelson translation p. 248-249)

Rambam

Perhaps the most classic answer is that given by Rambam, where he essentially says that though it seems like a contradiction it actually isn't, but we can't really understand why it's not.

Hilchot Teshuva 5:5

One might ask: Since The Holy One, blessed be He, knows everything that will occur before it comes to pass, does He or does He not know whether a person will be righteous or wicked?

If He knows that he will be righteous, [it appears] impossible for him not to be righteous. However, if one would say that despite His knowledge that he would be righteous, it is possible for him to be wicked, then His knowledge would be incomplete.

Know that the resolution to this question [can be described as]: "Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea." Many great and fundamental principles and lofty concepts are dependent upon it. However, the statements that I will make must be known and understood [as a basis for the comprehension of this matter].

As explained in the second chapter of Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, The Holy One, blessed be He, does not know with a knowledge that is external from Him as do men, whose knowledge and selves are two [different entities]. Rather, He, may His name be praised, and His knowledge are one.

Human knowledge cannot comprehend this concept in its entirety for just as it is beyond the potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator, as [Exodus 33:20] states: "No man will perceive, Me and live," so, too, it is beyond man's potential to comprehend and conceive the Creator's knowledge. This was the intent of the prophet's [Isaiah 55:8] statements: "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways, My ways."

Accordingly, we do not have the potential to conceive how The Holy One, blessed be He, knows all the creations and their deeds. However, this is known without any doubt: That man's actions are in his [own] hands and The Holy One, blessed be He, does not lead him [in a particular direction] or decree that he do anything.

This matter is known, not only as a tradition of faith, but also, through clear proofs from the words of wisdom. Consequently, the prophets taught that a person is judged for his deeds, according to his deeds - whether good or bad. This is a fundamental principle on which is dependent all the words of prophecy.

(Touger translation)

Ra'avad

Ra'avad famously critiques Rambam's answer, both methodologically and substantively. His own answer – which he admits is insufficient – is not entirely clear. He seems to be saying that God knows the future not in an objective deterministic sense, but that He knows the relative strengths of all the different factors and can thus know which factors will win out and therefore know what will actually occur.

Hilchot Teshuva 5:5

This author did not act in the way of the wise men, for a person does not begin a matter if he does not know how to complete it. But he began with difficult questions, and left the matter in difficulty and returned them [the readers] to faith. And it would have been better for him to leave the matter in the simpleness of the simple ones and not awaken their hearts and leave their minds in doubt, where perhaps a [bad] thought will come in their hearts for a moment about this. And even though there is no complete answer for this, it would have been good to provide a partial answer and say:

If the righteousness and wickedness of a person were dependent on the decree of God, we would say that His knowledge is His decree and we would have the very difficult question. But now that God has removed this dominion from His hand and given it to the hand of man himself, His knowledge is not a decree; rather, it is like the knowledge of the astrologers who know from another source what the ways of this person will be. And it is known that all happenings of man, small or big, God gave over to the power of the constellations, but He gave him intellect to give him the strength to escape from under [the influence of] the constellations. And that is the power given to man to be good or evil, while God knows the power of the constellations and its moments (?) whether the intellect has the power to let him escape from its [the constellations] hand or not, and this knowledge is not a decree. And all of this is not sufficient [to fully answer the question].

(My translation)

R. Joseph Ibn Kaspi

R. Joseph Ibn Kaspi seems to assert that God knows the future not through any causative act, but by mere dint of the fact that He is capable of analyzing all the factors and arriving at a correct prediction of what will happen. This seems similar to Ra'avad's explanation, but with a greater emphasis on the fact that God seems to be merely "guessing" and just always guesses correctly.

Tam Hakesef, Third Exposition

Ralbag

Ralbag seems to follow the same idea as Ra'avad and Ibn Kaspi – that God's knowledge of the various factors enables Him to "figure out" what will happen – with an important difference. Ralbag argues that because man has free will, it is possible for him to choose to do something contrary to what God had assessed he would do. Therefore, God's knowledge is not complete; it is merely a "best guess", with the possibility for it to be proven wrong.

Ralbag devoted Book III of his Wars of the Lord to a discussion of God's knowledge, but perhaps his clearest exposition of the contradiction is in his commentary to Genesis Chapter 18:

The sixteenth lesson is in ideas. And it is to teach us something amazing of God's knowledge of things, which was hidden from all [my] predecessors whose words have reached us. And it is that that which God may He be exalted knows of actions in this low world is independent of what man [actually] does. That is that He knows the actions of people that are fitting according to what was prepared for them from the day of their creation, based on the celestial causes that God may He be exalted placed as guidance over the human species. [However,] human choice rules over this arrangement of their actions based on the celestial causes. And it is therefore possible that what people actually do is different from what God may He be exalted knew [they would do] based on the arrangement of their actions. And this is because He knows their actions from the side in which knowledge of them is possible, and that is the side in which they are arranged and quantified. But on the side in which they are contingent there can be no knowledge, for if we suppose that knowledge of them is possible then their contingency cannot be upheld. And therefore it says metaphorically that God may He be exalted saw whether the people of Sodom and Gomorrah actually did the evil that He knew from them, because it is possible that what they had done was different from what God may He be exalted knew from them. And we have explained this topic of God's knowledge of things in Book III of Wars of the Lord. And we explained there that this view is necessary on the basis of philosophy as well as on the basis of Torah.

(My translation)