There is a great divide between the view of the sage R. Levi of blessed memory and the view of Ra'avad of blessed memory. For the view of R. Levi is that God's knowledge does not encompass that which man will do with his free will prior to the action being actualized, but only that which is fitting for him to do based on what is set for him by the celestial bodies. For if His knowledge encompassed that which [man] will do with his free will notwithstanding what is set for him by the celestial bodies, His knowledge would be decreeing [the action] and free will would be nullified. And with the nullification of free will the commandments, warnings, rewards, and punishments of the Torah would be nullified.

 

This view contains a great degradation – attributing deficiency to God's knowledge. And, moreover, according to his words it doesn't help if God knows man's action that was done with free will after he did it, if He doesn't know it. And if he does know it then there is an increase and a change in His knowledge, since He did not know it before and now He knows it – for the knowledge was generated to Him – and this is a great degradation. And if He does not know it even after it became actualized then He does not apprehend the actions of man, [in which case] reward and punishment are nullified and all the promises of the Torah said about this are nullified.

 

The view of Ra'avad of blessed memory is that God knows everything from two sides. He knows that which is set by the celestial bodies, and he knows whether the power of the intellect is strong enough to overcome the celestial bodies – whether this man's intellect is stronger than the celestial bodies or vice versa. And in this way He knows that which man will do before he does it. But once there is dominion in the hand of man to do good or evil, this knowledge is not a decree; it is rather like the knowledge of astrologers, where they know from an external source what the matters of this person will be. So, too, God knows from the perspective of the strength of the person's celestial influence and from the perspective of the strength of the intellect what this man will do – whether he will overcome the power of the celestial influence or not. This is what appears from the opinion of Ra'avad of blessed memory, and the rabbi was still not satisfied with this and he wrote "and all this does not suffice".

 

But what appears to me to answer this question is that we are forced to believe that man has free will over his actions, in order to uphold the commandment(s) of the Torah and its reward. This is made clear in the Torah [by verses such as] "see what I have placed before you etc." [and] "and you shall choose life". And we also should believe that God's knowledge encompasses everything man will do with his free will, before it becomes actualized. For we must not place any deficiency in His knowledge, heaven forfend. But this knowledge does not force anything, because once it is granted that man has free will and it is possible for him to do the opposite, then when God knew that he would do Action X He knew that he would do it with his free will and that it would be possible for him to do the opposite. This being the case, this knowledge does not force [anything], since the knowledge was that he would do that action with his free will. If [this knowledge] would force [a particular action] then this knowledge would contain a mixture of truth and falsehood, which is impossible. And this is why we say that man's action does not follow God's knowledge of that action before it is actualized; rather, His knowledge follows that action that was done with free will and with the possibility of doing the opposite, despite God knowing it before it became actualized. And with this man remains free and the knowledge of God [remains] complete, without any deficiency and without removing man from his free will.

 

(My translation)

Three points are necessarily affirmed according to the roots of the Torah, so far as we can apprehend: first, that God's knowledge encompasses the infinite; second that God's knowledge extends to the nonexistent; and third, that God has knowledge concerning possible alternatives without their nature as possible being changed.

 

(Weiss translation p. 121)

Concerning the third, namely, that God knows alternative possibilities – that is, that He has knowledge of which f two alternatives will be realized, without the nature of the possible changing: the necessity of this according to the Torah is evident. For if God's knowledge were to compel the alternative that He knows will be realized, there could be no element of command in the prescriptions and proscriptions of the Torah. For unless it is assumed that the one who is commanded acts voluntarily and not by compulsion or necessity, there is no possibility of commanding him. This is self-evident. Indeed the [contrary] notion is self-contradictory. For if God's knowledge were to compel one alternative, then this [compelled] alternative was never a possible thing. For what it means for a thing to be possible is that it might exist and might not exist. But if one alternative is compelled, then it is not a possible thing. Yet it was assumed to be a possible thing. It therefore follows necessarily that God's knowledge that one alternative will be realized does not make the nature of the possible necessary. This is the third point.

 

(Weiss translation p. 122-123)

The second is as follows. It is posited that God knows which one of two possible alternatives will be realized, while the contrary alternative remains possible. Yet it is evident with respect to any possible thing that when its existence is posited, no absurdity arises. Nevertheless, when we posit its existence [i.e. the existence of the contrary alternative], two absurdities do follow: the first, a change in God's knowledge and thus in his essence – inasmuch as the intellect is constituted by what it knows; the second, that the earlier knowledge was not in fact knowledge but was an erroneous conjecture. All this is the height of absurdity and nonsense.

 

(Weiss translation p. 126)

This, it appears, is the Rabbi's approach to resolving these difficulties. It is a comprehensive approach, correct and excellent and beyond doubt, regardless of how the term "knowledge" is understood – that is, whether it is thought to apply by way of absolute equivocation, as the Rabbi would have it, or whether it is predicated by way of priority and posterity and indicates, as it seems to us, an attribute of God's essence – since knowledge is essential to Him, as we saw in Book I Part III.

 

(Weiss translation p. 137)

The second [specific] difficulty [in relation to the third point] is based on the idea I that, if we posit as possible the contrary alternative to the one God knows [and it is that contrary alternative that is realized], two absurdities necessarily follow: the first, a change in God's knowledge; and the second, that His previous knowledge was not knowledge but was an erroneous conjecture. It is evident that this difficulty is inescapable if we draw an analogy between our knowledge and God's – unless we posit, regarding the alternative that He knows, that from one perspective it is possible, and, from another, necessary. And then, from the perspective from which the alternative is necessary, there is no change in God's knowledge or in His essence and, from the perspective from which it is possible, the status of possible is not annulled for possible things.

 

This will become clear in what I shall now say. There is no doubt that if a thing is necessary from one perspective, it does not follow that the thing is necessary in itself. This will be evident in things that are possible in themselves and exist now perceived by sense. For in the case of human knowledge, once it is known that a possible thing exists, its existence is positively necessary. And its contrary is not existent from any perspective. But this necessity does not change the nature of the thing's possibility and does not compel the thing's necessity in itself. Therefore, God's having knowledge with respect to things that are subject to choice does not compel their necessity in themselves and does not change at all the nature of the possible. This will indeed be clarified more expansively in Part IV, God willing. There the truth with regard to this matter will be established beyond doubt. In fact, most of those who have engaged in speculation have stumbled with respect to this issue, because they could not conceive of a necessity which the Torah's divine justice can accommodate. This suffices with respect to what we intended in this chapter.

 

(Weiss translation p. 140-141)

It was already established in Part I of this Book that God's knowledge encompasses all particulars qua particulars, even if they are nonexistent and have not come into existence. It is therefore necessary that when God knows which one of two possible alternatives will come into existence, that is the one that will necessarily come into existence. For otherwise what he has is not knowledge, but conjecture or error. Therefore, inescapably, what was presumed to be something possible is actually necessary.

 

(Weiss translation p. 192)

We assert that, since there are arguments that entail the existence of the nature of the possible, and arguments that entail its nonexistence, the only remaining option is for the nature of the possible to exist in one respect, and not to exist in another. What are these respects? If only I knew!

 

I say that, when we investigate the arguments that entail the existence of the possible, what emerges is that the only way in which they entail its existence is in respect of itself.

 

(Weiss translation p. 193)

It is evident, then, that in all the arguments from the point of view of speculation, what is entailed is the existence of the nature of of the possible in the things that are – in respect of themselves but not in respect of their causes.

 

(Weiss translation p. 194)

So, too, it is evident that the arguments deriving from God's knowledge of the future, and the prophets' prediction of future events – especially regarding those things dependent on choice – fail to disqualify possibility in respect of the thing itself. Indeed, things are possible in respect of themselves and necessary in respect of their causes; and it is from their aspect as necessary that knowledge precedes their existence.

 

(Weiss translation p. 195)

If, however, we have no alternative but to say that the nature of will in fact entails that one wills or does not will without an external mover – and this view is the correct one according to the Torah – it is then possible that a distinction along the lines of that drawn in Part I of this book applies. According to this distinction, things are possible both in respect of themselves and in respect of their causes, but are necessary in respect of the cause that is God's knowledge V just as the possible, when it is posited as existent and known, is possible in respect of itself but necessary in respect of its existing at the time and in respect of its having become known. If God's knowledge of things precedes their coming to be, then, since a thing that is possible is not necessary before it comes to be, it follows that things are possible, not in respect of God's knowledge, but in respect of themselves. And since God's knowledge is not subject to time, His knowledge of the future is like our knowledge of things that exist: it does not entail constraint and necessity in the essence of things. If, however, we were to object, saying: "Does God's knowledge derive from existents?" as per the last two difficulties, we would respond: "We do not know how God knows, since His knowledge is His essence." This is the Rabbi's approach, in our view.

 

(Weiss translation p. 196)

The principle that emerges from these considerations is that it is inescapable that that which is possible is necessary in respect of its cause and possible in respect of itself — so long as choice is not involved. And with regard to things in which choice is involved, if we say that the nature of will necessitates that it can will something or not will it with no external mover — and this is the correct approach according to the Torah — these things will be possible in respect both of their causes and of themselves, but necessary in respect of God's knowledge. And since they are possible in respect of themselves, industriousness is fitting with respect to them, as are the prescriptions and proscriptions, and as are their being subject to reward and punishment. For if the person were to choose the alternative, God's knowledge would be of the alternative. The only remaining question is: how does God know things that are possible? But we have already answered this, both in accordance with the view of the Rabbi and in accordance with our own view. Generally, since God confers existence on all other existents, His knowledge of them is fitting and necessary. Either way, the root of the entire matter is possibility in one respect, necessity in another. This is inescapable.

 

(Weiss translation p. 197)

But the question whether His knowledge determines one of the two alternatives or not, is one that requires careful investigation. The problem is this: If God's knowledge does determine the act, then a person is under compulsion in his conduct, and should not receive reward or punishment for the things he does, since he does them under necessity, for a person deserves praise or blame only when the initiative of his acts is his own and there is no compulsion. On the other hand, if God's knowledge does not determine the act, then the act may be realized contrary to God's knowledge, His knowledge would then be in disagreement with the facts, and it would not be knowledge, but ignorance and error and falsehood.

 

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 3)

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Now if the possible must exist and it can not be that God does not know particular things, for it would be a defect in His nature, the question arises, How can God's knowledge be in agreement with the truth and at the same time fail to determine one of the two possible alternatives? How can these two propositions be compatible, being seemingly contradictory at first sight?

 

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 5)

Saadia Gaon in his book, "Emunot ve-Deot," says that God's foreknowledge of the possible things is not the cause of their existence, just as His knowledge of that which has already come into existence is not the cause of its having some into existence. The thing retains its own nature, Similarly His knowledge of possible things is not the cause of their existence, and hence they retain their character as possible things. For if His knowledge were the cause of their existence, they would always exist, like the natural species. But since we see new individuals appearing every day, it follows that their existence is not determined by His knowledge. And therefore they retain their character as possible things. These are the words of the Gaon, and the author of the Cusari in the fifth book of that treatise adopts the same view. But this is not satisfactory, for it is very much like saying that God does not know possible things. For if He knows them, and yet their existence is not determined by His knowledge, it might turn out that His knowledge would be different from the actual result, and this would not be knowledge but ignorance.

 

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 5-6)

<!>

Some one of the moderns' solved this (difficulty by saying that a thing may be necessary if we consider it in relation to its causes, and possible if we consider it by itself. Take, for example, the question of rain tomorrow. Considered by itself, it is possible; considered in relation to its causes, namely the rise of the vapors, the great quantity of moisture and similar things already in existence, it is necessary. God, therefore, knows that it will rain tomorrow, because, considered in relation to its causes, it is necessary, though considered by itself it is possible. The author in question expatiates at length in making his solution appear plausible.

 

But if we examine this view carefully, we shall find that unlike the first opinion this one is very close to the view that all things are determined and that the possible does not exist. For since the things are necessary considered in relation to their causes, if God knows the causes, they are actually necessary. What good is there then in saying that they are possible considered by themselves, as long as they are determined and necessary from that side which brings them into existence, namely the causes? For they can not come into existence in any other way. They are possible in the theoretical sense that the causes might have been different and then the effect would have been different. But in reality the effect is necessary when the causes are there and God knows them. It would follow then according to this opinion that there is no thing that may equally be or not be when considered in relation to its causes. For if the causes determining the two opposite alternatives are equal, the question arises again, what is it that determined one of the alternatives in preference to the other? If it is the knowledge of God that determines, the category of the possible is done away with; and if we retain the possible, God's knowledge is taken away, unless indeed we say that the possible exists only logically and conceptually, but not actually. But this is contrary to hypothesis. Much has been said in the solution of this question. But if we examine it all we find that it is of the nature described above, namely some of it approximates to the first opinion, and some of it approximates to the second opinion. Therefore I do not think it necessary to quote it here, so as not to prolong our discussion needlessly. My own opinion will be explained after I have made an introductory observation in the following chapter.

 

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 6-8)

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But if you ask, how is it possible to maintain both of these opinions, viz. to maintain the reality of the contingent and at the same time to hold that God's knowledge embraces it? Our answer is the same as that of Maimonides, who says: that since God's knowledge is essential in Him and not something added to His essence, the investigation of the character of His knowledge is tantamount to an investigation of His essence. But His essence is absolutely unknown, hence the character of His knowledge is also absolutely unknown. As there is no comparison or similarity between His existence and the existence of other things, so there is no comparison between His knowledge and the knowledge of others. Hence though if we picture His knowledge on the analogy of our own, a great many objections follow, such as that we must either deny the reality of the Contingent or assume that His knowledge embraces that which we can not conceive as knowable, for He would have to know the infinite, or His knowledge would change with the change of the objects, and other difficulties of this sort — this would follow only if we conceive of His knowledge on the analogy of our own, but since His knowledge is not of the same kind as ours, these difficulties do not follow. God's knowledge is infinite, and infinite knowledge is not liable to these difficulties.

 

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 18-19)

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If we understand the words of Maimonides concerning God's knowledge in this manner, all the objections adduced by later writers will disappear. The result of all this is that God's knowledge, being infinite, embraces everything that happens in the world without necessitating change in God, and without destroying the category of the contingent. It also embraces the infinite. I have selected this view as the best in this matter. Our Rabbis also adopt it, expressing the idea anonymously and without naming any opponent thereof : "All is foreseen, yet permission is given." "All is foreseen," signifies that God's knowledge embraces everything that happens in the world, and that nothing happens by accident without being known in advance. "Yet permission is given," signifies that the category of the contingent is real and God's knowledge does not destroy it. This is the truth in reference to this matter, though our knowledge is not sufficient to understand the possibility of this thing. This much will suffice as a brief discussion of God's knowledge.

 

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 23-24)

There is a great divide between the view of the sage R. Levi of blessed memory and the view of Ra'avad of blessed memory. For the view of R. Levi is that God's knowledge does not encompass that which man will do with his free will prior to the action being actualized, but only that which is fitting for him to do based on what is set for him by the celestial bodies. For if His knowledge encompassed that which [man] will do with his free will notwithstanding what is set for him by the celestial bodies, His knowledge would be decreeing [the action] and free will would be nullified. And with the nullification of free will the commandments, warnings, rewards, and punishments of the Torah would be nullified.

This view contains a great degradation – attributing deficiency to God's knowledge. And, moreover, according to his words it doesn't help if God knows man's action that was done with free will after he did it, if He doesn't know it. And if he does know it then there is an increase and a change in His knowledge, since He did not know it before and now He knows it – for the knowledge was generated to Him – and this is a great degradation. And if He does not know it even after it became actualized then He does not apprehend the actions of man, [in which case] reward and punishment are nullified and all the promises of the Torah said about this are nullified.

The view of Ra'avad of blessed memory is that God knows everything from two sides. He knows that which is set by the celestial bodies, and he knows whether the power of the intellect is strong enough to overcome the celestial bodies – whether this man's intellect is stronger than the celestial bodies or vice versa. And in this way He knows that which man will do before he does it. But once there is dominion in the hand of man to do good or evil, this knowledge is not a decree; it is rather like the knowledge of astrologers, where they know from an external source what the matters of this person will be. So, too, God knows from the perspective of the strength of the person's celestial influence and from the perspective of the strength of the intellect what this man will do – whether he will overcome the power of the celestial influence or not. This is what appears from the opinion of Ra'avad of blessed memory, and the rabbi was still not satisfied with this and he wrote "and all this does not suffice".

But what appears to me to answer this question is that we are forced to believe that man has free will over his actions, in order to uphold the commandment(s) of the Torah and its reward. This is made clear in the Torah [by verses such as] "see what I have placed before you etc." [and] "and you shall choose life". And we also should believe that God's knowledge encompasses everything man will do with his free will, before it becomes actualized. For we must not place any deficiency in His knowledge, heaven forfend. But this knowledge does not force anything, because once it is granted that man has free will and it is possible for him to do the opposite, then when God knew that he would do Action X He knew that he would do it with his free will and that it would be possible for him to do the opposite. This being the case, this knowledge does not force [anything], since the knowledge was that he would do that action with his free will. If [this knowledge] would force [a particular action] then this knowledge would contain a mixture of truth and falsehood, which is impossible. And this is why we say that man's action does not follow God's knowledge of that action before it is actualized; rather, His knowledge follows that action that was done with free will and with the possibility of doing the opposite, despite God knowing it before it became actualized. And with this man remains free and the knowledge of God [remains] complete, without any deficiency and without removing man from his free will.

(My translation)

Three points are necessarily affirmed according to the roots of the Torah, so far as we can apprehend: first, that God's knowledge encompasses the infinite; second that God's knowledge extends to the nonexistent; and third, that God has knowledge concerning possible alternatives without their nature as possible being changed.

(Weiss translation p. 121)

Concerning the third, namely, that God knows alternative possibilities – that is, that He has knowledge of which of two alternatives will be realized, without the nature of the possible changing: the necessity of this according to the Torah is evident. For if God's knowledge were to compel the alternative that He knows will be realized, there could be no element of command in the prescriptions and proscriptions of the Torah. For unless it is assumed that the one who is commanded acts voluntarily and not by compulsion or necessity, there is no possibility of commanding him. This is self-evident. Indeed the [contrary] notion is self-contradictory. For if God's knowledge were to compel one alternative, then this [compelled] alternative was never a possible thing. For what it means for a thing to be possible is that it might exist and might not exist. But if one alternative is compelled, then it is not a possible thing. Yet it was assumed to be a possible thing. It therefore follows necessarily that God's knowledge that one alternative will be realized does not make the nature of the possible necessary. This is the third point.

(Weiss translation p. 122-123)

The second is as follows. It is posited that God knows which one of two possible alternatives will be realized, while the contrary alternative remains possible. Yet it is evident with respect to any possible thing that when its existence is posited, no absurdity arises. Nevertheless, when we posit its existence [i.e. the existence of the contrary alternative], two absurdities do follow: the first, a change in God's knowledge and thus in his essence – inasmuch as the intellect is constituted by what it knows; the second, that the earlier knowledge was not in fact knowledge but was an erroneous conjecture. All this is the height of absurdity and nonsense.

(Weiss translation p. 126)

This, it appears, is the Rabbi's approach to resolving these difficulties. It is a comprehensive approach, correct and excellent and beyond doubt, regardless of how the term "knowledge" is understood – that is, whether it is thought to apply by way of absolute equivocation, as the Rabbi would have it, or whether it is predicated by way of priority and posterity and indicates, as it seems to us, an attribute of God's essence – since knowledge is essential to Him, as we saw in Book I Part III.

(Weiss translation p. 137)

The second [specific] difficulty [in relation to the third point] is based on the idea I that, if we posit as possible the contrary alternative to the one God knows [and it is that contrary alternative that is realized], two absurdities necessarily follow: the first, a change in God's knowledge; and the second, that His previous knowledge was not knowledge but was an erroneous conjecture. It is evident that this difficulty is inescapable if we draw an analogy between our knowledge and God's – unless we posit, regarding the alternative that He knows, that from one perspective it is possible, and, from another, necessary. And then, from the perspective from which the alternative is necessary, there is no change in God's knowledge or in His essence and, from the perspective from which it is possible, the status of possible is not annulled for possible things.

This will become clear in what I shall now say. There is no doubt that if a thing is necessary from one perspective, it does not follow that the thing is necessary in itself. This will be evident in things that are possible in themselves and exist now perceived by sense. For in the case of human knowledge, once it is known that a possible thing exists, its existence is positively necessary. And its contrary is not existent from any perspective. But this necessity does not change the nature of the thing's possibility and does not compel the thing's necessity in itself. Therefore, God's having knowledge with respect to things that are subject to choice does not compel their necessity in themselves and does not change at all the nature of the possible. This will indeed be clarified more expansively in Part IV, God willing. There the truth with regard to this matter will be established beyond doubt. In fact, most of those who have engaged in speculation have stumbled with respect to this issue, because they could not conceive of a necessity which the Torah's divine justice can accommodate. This suffices with respect to what we intended in this chapter.

(Weiss translation p. 140-141)

It was already established in Part I of this Book that God's knowledge encompasses all particulars qua particulars, even if they are nonexistent and have not come into existence. It is therefore necessary that when God knows which one of two possible alternatives will come into existence, that is the one that will necessarily come into existence. For otherwise what he has is not knowledge, but conjecture or error. Therefore, inescapably, what was presumed to be something possible is actually necessary.

(Weiss translation p. 192)

We assert that, since there are arguments that entail the existence of the nature of the possible, and arguments that entail its nonexistence, the only remaining option is for the nature of the possible to exist in one respect, and not to exist in another. What are these respects? If only I knew!

I say that, when we investigate the arguments that entail the existence of the possible, what emerges is that the only way in which they entail its existence is in respect of itself.

(Weiss translation p. 193)

It is evident, then, that in all the arguments from the point of view of speculation, what is entailed is the existence of the nature of of the possible in the things that are – in respect of themselves but not in respect of their causes.

(Weiss translation p. 194)

So, too, it is evident that the arguments deriving from God's knowledge of the future, and the prophets' prediction of future events – especially regarding those things dependent on choice – fail to disqualify possibility in respect of the thing itself. Indeed, things are possible in respect of themselves and necessary in respect of their causes; and it is from their aspect as necessary that knowledge precedes their existence.

(Weiss translation p. 195)

If, however, we have no alternative but to say that the nature of will in fact entails that one wills or does not will without an external mover – and this view is the correct one according to the Torah – it is then possible that a distinction along the lines of that drawn in Part I of this book applies. According to this distinction, things are possible both in respect of themselves and in respect of their causes, but are necessary in respect of the cause that is God's knowledge V just as the possible, when it is posited as existent and known, is possible in respect of itself but necessary in respect of its existing at the time and in respect of its having become known. If God's knowledge of things precedes their coming to be, then, since a thing that is possible is not necessary before it comes to be, it follows that things are possible, not in respect of God's knowledge, but in respect of themselves. And since God's knowledge is not subject to time, His knowledge of the future is like our knowledge of things that exist: it does not entail constraint and necessity in the essence of things. If, however, we were to object, saying: "Does God's knowledge derive from existents?" as per the last two difficulties, we would respond: "We do not know how God knows, since His knowledge is His essence." This is the Rabbi's approach, in our view.

(Weiss translation p. 196)

The principle that emerges from these considerations is that it is inescapable that that which is possible is necessary in respect of its cause and possible in respect of itself — so long as choice is not involved. And with regard to things in which choice is involved, if we say that the nature of will necessitates that it can will something or not will it with no external mover — and this is the correct approach according to the Torah — these things will be possible in respect both of their causes and of themselves, but necessary in respect of God's knowledge. And since they are possible in respect of themselves, industriousness is fitting with respect to them, as are the prescriptions and proscriptions, and as are their being subject to reward and punishment. For if the person were to choose the alternative, God's knowledge would be of the alternative. The only remaining question is: how does God know things that are possible? But we have already answered this, both in accordance with the view of the Rabbi and in accordance with our own view. Generally, since God confers existence on all other existents, His knowledge of them is fitting and necessary. Either way, the root of the entire matter is possibility in one respect, necessity in another. This is inescapable.

(Weiss translation p. 197)

But the question whether His knowledge determines one of the two alternatives or not, is one that requires careful investigation. The problem is this: If God's knowledge does determine the act, then a person is under compulsion in his conduct, and should not receive reward or punishment for the things he does, since he does them under necessity, for a person deserves praise or blame only when the initiative of his acts is his own and there is no compulsion. On the other hand, if God's knowledge does not determine the act, then the act may be realized contrary to God's knowledge, His knowledge would then be in disagreement with the facts, and it would not be knowledge, but ignorance and error and falsehood.

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 3)

Now if the possible must exist and it can not be that God does not know particular things, for it would be a defect in His nature, the question arises, How can God's knowledge be in agreement with the truth and at the same time fail to determine one of the two possible alternatives? How can these two propositions be compatible, being seemingly contradictory at first sight?

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 5)

Saadia Gaon in his book, "Emunot ve-Deot," says that God's foreknowledge of the possible things is not the cause of their existence, just as His knowledge of that which has already come into existence is not the cause of its having some into existence. The thing retains its own nature, Similarly His knowledge of possible things is not the cause of their existence, and hence they retain their character as possible things. For if His knowledge were the cause of their existence, they would always exist, like the natural species. But since we see new individuals appearing every day, it follows that their existence is not determined by His knowledge. And therefore they retain their character as possible things. These are the words of the Gaon, and the author of the Cusari in the fifth book of that treatise adopts the same view. But this is not satisfactory, for it is very much like saying that God does not know possible things. For if He knows them, and yet their existence is not determined by His knowledge, it might turn out that His knowledge would be different from the actual result, and this would not be knowledge but ignorance.

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 5-6)

Some one of the moderns' solved this (difficulty by saying that a thing may be necessary if we consider it in relation to its causes, and possible if we consider it by itself. Take, for example, the question of rain tomorrow. Considered by itself, it is possible; considered in relation to its causes, namely the rise of the vapors, the great quantity of moisture and similar things already in existence, it is necessary. God, therefore, knows that it will rain tomorrow, because, considered in relation to its causes, it is necessary, though considered by itself it is possible. The author in question expatiates at length in making his solution appear plausible.

But if we examine this view carefully, we shall find that unlike the first opinion this one is very close to the view that all things are determined and that the possible does not exist. For since the things are necessary considered in relation to their causes, if God knows the causes, they are actually necessary. What good is there then in saying that they are possible considered by themselves, as long as they are determined and necessary from that side which brings them into existence, namely the causes? For they can not come into existence in any other way. They are possible in the theoretical sense that the causes might have been different and then the effect would have been different. But in reality the effect is necessary when the causes are there and God knows them. It would follow then according to this opinion that there is no thing that may equally be or not be when considered in relation to its causes. For if the causes determining the two opposite alternatives are equal, the question arises again, what is it that determined one of the alternatives in preference to the other? If it is the knowledge of God that determines, the category of the possible is done away with; and if we retain the possible, God's knowledge is taken away, unless indeed we say that the possible exists only logically and conceptually, but not actually. But this is contrary to hypothesis. Much has been said in the solution of this question. But if we examine it all we find that it is of the nature described above, namely some of it approximates to the first opinion, and some of it approximates to the second opinion. Therefore I do not think it necessary to quote it here, so as not to prolong our discussion needlessly. My own opinion will be explained after I have made an introductory observation in the following chapter.

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 6-8)

But if you ask, how is it possible to maintain both of these opinions, viz. to maintain the reality of the contingent and at the same time to hold that God's knowledge embraces it? Our answer is the same as that of Maimonides, who says: that since God's knowledge is essential in Him and not something added to His essence, the investigation of the character of His knowledge is tantamount to an investigation of His essence. But His essence is absolutely unknown, hence the character of His knowledge is also absolutely unknown. As there is no comparison or similarity between His existence and the existence of other things, so there is no comparison between His knowledge and the knowledge of others. Hence though if we picture His knowledge on the analogy of our own, a great many objections follow, such as that we must either deny the reality of the Contingent or assume that His knowledge embraces that which we can not conceive as knowable, for He would have to know the infinite, or His knowledge would change with the change of the objects, and other difficulties of this sort — this would follow only if we conceive of His knowledge on the analogy of our own, but since His knowledge is not of the same kind as ours, these difficulties do not follow. God's knowledge is infinite, and infinite knowledge is not liable to these difficulties.

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 18-19)

If we understand the words of Maimonides concerning God's knowledge in this manner, all the objections adduced by later writers will disappear. The result of all this is that God's knowledge, being infinite, embraces everything that happens in the world without necessitating change in God, and without destroying the category of the contingent. It also embraces the infinite. I have selected this view as the best in this matter. Our Rabbis also adopt it, expressing the idea anonymously and without naming any opponent thereof : "All is foreseen, yet permission is given." "All is foreseen," signifies that God's knowledge embraces everything that happens in the world, and that nothing happens by accident without being known in advance. "Yet permission is given," signifies that the category of the contingent is real and God's knowledge does not destroy it. This is the truth in reference to this matter, though our knowledge is not sufficient to understand the possibility of this thing. This much will suffice as a brief discussion of God's knowledge.

(Husik translation, Vol. IV Part 1 p. 23-24)