Should someone who isn't 100% certain of God's existence be considered a kofer?

Question

I was told by two respected Roshai Yeshiva that one who isn't certain of God's existence (an agnostic) is not deemed to be a kofer (denier of His existence) as long as he thinks that His existence is probable. So one who is 51% sure of God's existence is not a kofer, but one who is 49% sure of it is. They both admitted that they had no source for this, but thought it was logical.

Can anyone provide a source for this? Are there other views? Does one have to be 100% certain of God's existence to not be considered a kofer? Is someone who isn't convinced that God exists, but is a fully practicing Jew because of Pascal's wager considered a kofer?

Answer 1

The Rambam changes his language in two places where he discusses our awareness of G-d's existence.

In the introduction to the 10th chapter of Sanhedrin, where the Rambam lays out his 13 Principles, the Rambam discusses "belief" in Hashem's existence. (Depending which translation you look at, the term "belief" is in the text of the Principle itself, but in Kapach's translation it is not in the description of the Principle, but is in the Rambam's concluding paragraph, in which he says about all 13 "belief.") The Rambam (in Kapach's translation) sums up with:

וכאשר יהיו קיימים לאדם כל היסודות הללו ואמונתו בהם אמתית הרי הוא נכנס בכלל ישראל

(paraphrased):

"anyone who believes these 13 principles is not an apikorus.

On the other hand, in Yesodei Hatorah, both in the koseres and in the first halacha, the Rambam says that the mitzvah is to know that G-d exists:

יש בכללן עשר מצוות--שש מצוות עשה, וארבע מצוות לא תעשה; וזה הוא פרטן: (א) לידע שיש שם אלוה

(paraphrased):

The first Mitzvah is to know that G-d exists.

(In the Sefer Hamitzvos many printings have "להאמין" by the Mitzvah, but the mistake in that translation has been pointed out numerous times. See the notes in the Frankel Rambam there for a nice summary.)

R' Yaakov Weinberg explained that the discrepancy is because in the 13 Principles, the Rambam is not listing Mitzvos - he is making statements - if you believe these 13 things, you will not be an apikorus. For not being an apikorus, belief is enough. But the Mitzvah of awareness of G-d is to know that He exists - to take that belief and develop it into knowledge.

As an extra credit point, R' Weinberg explained why both sides of this contrast make sense. The Mitzvah has to be to know, because you cannot have a Mitzvah to believe in G-d - if you believe He exists, then the Mitzvah is unnecessary, and if you don't believe He exists, then you won't be accepting a commandment from someone you don't believe exists. The Principle is to believe, because the nature of the Principles is forming the framework in which you will not be able to justify for yourself to not serve Hashem. For that, belief that He exists is enough.

However, this just means that 100% is not the requirement to leave the category of apikorus. If someone is just playing the odds, but doesn't really believe that He exists, that would not suffice. They would need to have strong enough belief to not be able to convince themselves that He doesn't exist when it becomes convenient to do so. (I can't put a percentage on that #.)

Answer 2

This Chabad Article deals with agnosticism which Thomas Huxley defined as the "doctrine that humans cannot know of the existence of anything beyond the phenomena of their experience" (and therefore, my words, cannot be sure of the existence of G-d).

The article quotes the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn (1880-1950) who told one self-proclaimed atheist, "We are all believers in G-d. It is just a matter of definition."

Therefore someone who isn't 100% certain of God's existence should not be considered a unbeliever.

Answer 3

There is perhaps an indication from Rashi that someone who is unsure is not a kofer. In Maseches Shabbos 31a, in referring to someone whom Hillel had converted even though the person had said that he believes in the Written Law but not the Oral Law, Rashi writes:

שלא היה כופר בתורה שבעל פה אלא שלא היה מאמין שהיא מפי הגבורה

That he did not deny the Oral Law; he just didn't believe that it was from the mouth of God.

While the simple reading of this is that Rashi is contrasting the complete denial of the Oral Law with the acceptance of the Oral Law while not acknowledging its Divine origin, R. Shmuel Strashun interprets it differently.

נ"ל כוונתו דכופר לא מיקרי אלא אחר החקירה בכל חלקי הסותר אבל זה לא חקר ולא נוכח אלא שלא היה מאמין

It appears to me that his [Rashi's] intent is that one is not called a "denier" (כופר) except after investigating all aspects of the issue. But this person did not investigate or study; he simply didn't believe.

I think that R. Strashun is saying that the contrast Rashi is making is between someone who denies, and someone who doesn't believe. In other words, in order to be considered a kofer you have to actually actively conclude that the idea in question is false. Simply being unsure of its truth does not qualify someone as a kofer.