Rambam on the relationship between oneness and incorporeality

Question

One of Rambam's arguments for the existence of only one God is that the existence of multiple gods by definition implies some form of corporeality.

Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 1:7

אלוה זה אחד הוא ואינו שנים ולא יתר על שנים אלא אחד שאין כיחודו אחד מן האחדים הנמצאים בעולם לא אחד כמין שהוא כולל אחדים הרבה ולא אחד כגוף שהוא נחלק למחלקות ולקצוות אלא יחוד שאין יחוד אחר כמותו בעולם אילו היו אלוהות הרבה היו גופין וגויות מפני שאין הנמנים השוין במציאותן נפרדין זה מזה אלא במאורעין שיארעו בגופות והגויות ואילו היה היוצר גוף וגוייה היה לו קץ ותכלית שאי אפשר להיות גוף שאין לו קץ וכל שיש לגופו קץ ותכלית יש לכחו קץ וסוף ואלהינו ברוך שמו הואיל וכחו אין לו קץ ואינו פוסק שהרי הגלגל סובב תמיד אין כחו כח גוף והואיל ואינו גוף לא יארעו לו מאורעות הגופות כדי שיהא נחלק ונפרד מאחר לפיכך אי אפשר שיהיה אלא אחד וידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה שנאמר ה' אלהינו ה' אחד

This God is one. He is not two or more, but one, unified in a manner which [surpasses] any unity that is found in the world; i.e., He is not one in the manner of a general category which includes many individual entities, nor one in the way that the body is divided into different portions and dimensions. Rather, He is unified, and there exists no unity similar to His in this world.

If there were many gods¹, they would have body and form, because like entities are separated from each other only through the circumstances associated with body and form.

Were the Creator to have body and form, He would have limitation and definition, because it is impossible for a body not to be limited. And any entity which itself is limited and defined [possesses] only limited and defined power. Since our God, blessed be His name, possesses unlimited power, as evidenced by the continuous revolution of the sphere, we see that His power is not the power of a body. Since He is not a body, the circumstances associated with bodies that produce division and separation are not relevant to Him. Therefore, it is impossible for Him to be anything other than one.

The knowledge of this concept fulfills a positive commandment, as [implied by Deuteronomy 6:4]: "[Hear, Israel,] God is our Lord, God is one." (Chabad.org)

However, when he discusses angels he asserts that they are also incorporeal, yet he states that there are many different angels.

Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 2:2-5

כל מה שברא הקב"ה בעולמו נחלק לשלשה חלקים מהן ברואים שהן מחוברים מגולם וצורה והם הווים ונפסדים תמיד כמו גופות האדם והבהמה והצמחים והמתכות ומהן ברואים שהן מחוברים מגולם וצורה אבל אינן משתנין מגוף לגוף ומצורה לצורה כמו הראשונים אלא צורתן קבועה לעולם בגולמם ואינן משתנין כמו אלו והם הגלגלים והכוכבים שבהן ואין גולמם כשאר גולמים ולא צורתם כשאר צורות ומהן ברואים צורה בלא גולם כלל והם המלאכים שהמלאכים אינם גוף וגויה אלא צורות נפרדות זו מזו

ומהו זה שהנביאים אומרים שראו המלאך אש ובעל כנפים הכל במראה הנבואה ודרך חידה לומר שאינו גוף ואינו כבד כגופות הכבדים כמו שנאמר כי ה' אלהיך אש אוכלה הוא ואינו אש אלא משל וכמו שנאמר עושה מלאכיו רוחות

ובמה יפרדו הצורות זו מזו והרי אינן גופין לפי שאינן שוין במציאותן אלא כל אחד מהן למטה ממעלתו של חבירו והוא מצוי מכחו זה למעלה מזה והכל נמצאים מכחו של הקדוש ברוך הוא וטובו וזהו שרמז שלמה בחכמתו ואמר כי גבוה מעל גבוה שומר

Everything which the Holy One, blessed be He, created within His world is divided into three categories. They include:

a) Creations which are a combination of matter and form. They are constantly coming into existence and ceasing to exist; for example, the bodies of man and beasts, plants, and metals.

b) Creations which are [also] a combination of matter and form, but do not change from body to body and from form to form as those in the first category. Rather, their form is permanently fixed in their matter, and they do not change as the others do; for example, the spheres and the stars [which revolve] in them. The matter [from which] they [are composed] differs from [a simple conception of] matter, and their form differs from [a simple conception of] form.

c) Creations which have form, but no matter at all; for example, the angels, for the angels do not possess bodies or corporeal being, but rather are forms which are separate from each other.

What is meant by the prophets' statements that they saw an angel of fire or with wings? All these are prophetic visions and parables, as [Deuteronomy 4:24] states: "God, your Lord, is consuming fire," though He is not fire and [the description of Him in this manner] is only metaphoric. Similarly, [Psalms 104:4] states: "He makes His angels as winds...."

Since they possess no body, what separates the form [of the angels] from each other? Their existence is not alike. Rather each one is below the level of the other and exists by virtue of its influence, [in a progression of levels,] one above the other.

Everything exists by virtue of the influence of the Holy One, blessed be He, and His goodness. Solomon alluded to this [concept] in his wisdom, saying (Ecclesiastes 5:7): "Because above the one who is high there is a watcher [and there are others higher than them]." (Chabad.org)

Why is it that angels can be distinguished from each other without a physical manifestation, yet gods cannot be distinguished from each other without a physical manifestation?

Even if one were to argue, as does R. Elyahu Touger in his footnote to 1:7, that Rambam is even referring to "a spiritual sense of these concepts", it does not explain why gods cannot be differentiated while angels can.

If one were to point out that the very method of differentiation of angels is based on their hierarchy of levels which, if existing for gods would by definition render them non-gods (if there is a god on a higher level, the lower god by definition is lacking a quality of godliness) then Rambam's argument is really a different argument – that the existence of multiple gods is impossible because the definition of god entails absolute power and it is impossible for two separate entities to both have absolute power (as discussed by Saadia Gaon in Emunos V'Deios 2:2).

See also Guide for the Perplexed 2:1 where Rambam writes:

The hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, because absolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.), except as cause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable to God (Prop. XV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him. (Friedlander translation.)

Once again it appears that this argument must necessarily be predicated on the argument of impossibility of two absolute powers. Thus, the argument from the impossibility of distinguishing incorporeal entities should either be insufficient or unnecessary to prove that there is only one god.

Any answers, or flaws/incorrect assumptions in the question?

[I think the Peirush sort of addresses this, but he makes the proof dependent on a different earlier premise, namely, that there can only be one First Cause. If that is the case then once again this specific proof should be either insufficient or unnecessary.]

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^{1.One of the answers challenged this translation, and said that the word here is "godliness" rather than gods. I would therefore note that the Feldheim translation by Moses Hyamson agrees with R. Touger's translation:}

^{If there were plural deities, these would be physical bodies;}

Answer 1

Why is it that angels can be distinguished from each other without a physical manifestation, yet gods cannot be distinguished from each other without a physical manifestation?

[I've quoted your comment, because it appears to me to more succinctly articulate the question]

My answer:

Equal essences/existences (מציאות) are separated from each other only through the circumstances associated with body and form. Multiple equal essences (שוין במציאותן) cannot coexist incorporeally. Mutiple essences that are not equal in essence can coexist incorporeally. Therefore, gods/divinities (assumed to be equal in essence), cannot coexist incorporeally. Angels, which are NOT equal in their מציאות (their מציאות are hierarchically distinguished in the chain of causation), can coexist.

Answer 2

(As far as I understand)

There are two separate discussions. One discussion is how many gods there are. In that discussion, your points as to the incompleteness of the Rambam's argument, as well as the relevance of Rav Saadia's argument, would apply. That discussion is the topic of the previous halacha in the Rambam, halacha 1:6:

וכל המעלה על דעתו שיש שם אלוה אחר, חוץ מזה--עובר בלא תעשה

Anyone who considers that there is another god other than This One violates a negative commandment ...

Our halacha is now discussing the G-d, which was already established that He is the only one. Now Rambam ise discussing whether this G-d is one or consists of multiplicity, or parts. Thus Rambam starts this halacha with

אלוה זה אחד הוא--אינו לא שניים ולא יתר על שניים, אלא אחד

This G-d is one. He is not two nor three, rather one

In which the Rambam is discussing the "number," so to speak, of this one G-d.

Rambam continues:

אילו היו (ה)אלוהות הרבה--היו גופין וגווייות

If Godliness was many...

The Rambam does not say אילו היו אלוהים הרבה, if there were many gods, but if the concept of G-d were many. In this discussion, differentiating between something which is one unified concept could only be done by the arbitrary distinction of a boundary, or physical distinction. Thus the Rambam negates that possibility.

Answer 3

Your question:

Why is it that angels can be distinguished from each other without a physical manifestation, yet gods cannot be distinguished from each other without a physical manifestation?

is, in general, based upon a false assumption.

You list all these details that Rambam uses to define G-d's uniqueness. Then you look at Rambam using similar language in the context of angels and make the assumption that because of that similar language it can be applied uniformly to either subject, meaning to G-d and to angels. That assumption, that the two subjects are equal, is incorrect.

G-d is not a 'נברא', a created thing or being. G-d always is, was and will be. All of creation, including all categories of angels are נבראים, creations. They have a beginning (and possibly an end). This distinction is the essence of Mishnah Torah, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, 1:1-4.

By definition, you cannot place the limitations of the creations upon that which transcends creation altogether. This is the meaning of what is found in Yalkut Shimoni on the Torah 117:2 which says:

למה מכנין שמו של הקב"ה וקורין אותו מקום מפני שהוא מקומו של עולם ואין העולם מקומו.

Answer 4

The Unity of God

Maimonides felt that G-d's immateriality was proof of His Oness. Maimonides explains:

This G-d is one; He is neither two nor more than two; He is simply one. His unity is not like any other oneness that exists in the world. His is not the unity of a kind that encompasses many other single particulars; and it is not like the unity of a body that is divided into parts and extremities; rather it is a unity that is entirely unlike any other sort of oneness in the universe. (MT, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, 1:7)

Maimonides refutes the notion of multiplicity in G-d in favor of G-d’s transcendence. For G-d to be multiple He wold have to be material. A notion Maimonides strongly rejects. Maimonides explains:

If G-d were many, He would have a body and physicality, because items that are co-extensive with each other cannot be counted as distinct from one another except through occurrences that happen to their bodies. (MT, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, 1:7)

And:

If the Creator had a body, He would have a defined form for it is impossible that there should be a body that is not defined. And anything that is defined is limited in its power. (MT, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, 1:7)

Angels

Maimonides did not understand angels as commenly understood. Howard Kreisel explains:

The separate intellects, together with the celestial spheres and the natural existents and forces of the sublunar world, are the “angels” spoken of in the Bible and in rabbinic literature according to Maimonides. The only existents not considered by him to be angels are the “angels” as they are literally depicted. Such creatures do not exist in his ontology. Maimonides considers the biblical and rabbinic descriptions of the angels to be imaginative representations, primarily of the separateintellects. (“Moses Maimonides,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, 1997, 255).

Maimonides writes:

“This is also the view we meet in all parts of Scripture; every act of G-d is described as being performed by angels [emphasis added]. But ‘angel’ means ‘messenger’; hence every one that is entrusted with a certain mission is an angel. Even the movement of the brute creation…. It is also used of ideals, perceived by prophetic visions, and of man’s animal powers…. [F]or natural forces and angels are identical. How bad and injurious is the blindness of ignorance!” (Guide, 2:6).

Thus, He explains that the term “angel” refers to the “natural forces.” He did not belive in winged intermediaries. His depersonification of biblical anthropomorphisms in angels is an attempt to show his correct vision of Judaism which is solely monotheistic.

Answer 5

I think that Maimonides felt that angels were simply natural forces such as rain, wind, and snow. To see a full description of angels, please see my answer here. I think he felt strongly that it was philosophically impossible to have a multiplicity of gods.