How can God be just in light of Deuteronomy 23:3?

Question

Deuteronomy 23:3: A bastard shall not enter into the assembly of the LORD; even to the tenth generation shall none of his enter into the assembly of the LORD.

I asked a similar question here -

Why can't an illegitimate child enter the temple?

But perhaps I did not clarify myself enough and got answers that explained the verse without addressing the goodness of God issue.

So here I ask again.

How is it just to punish a child (in any way, be that entering congregation or something else) who did not have any participation in the sin?

Looking at it it seems that modern secular humanists are more just & loving than God himself, as very few would discriminate against such

Edit: Some of the comments seem to suggest that this punishing of child is in some way good and that we simply can't understand goodness of God.

But I don't think I'm misunderstanding justice or love. Here is justice in God's own view -

Ezekiel 18:20 The son will not share the guilt of the father, nor will the father share the guilt of the son.

Answer 1

I agree with @ba, but will approach this slightly differently:

We certainly understand how people with physical ailments are restricted from physical circumstances. You have to be in good health to go on roller-coasters, to go sky diving, etc.

But Judaism is not just a physical religion of doing acts, it is spiritual as well. A person who comes into contact with a corpse, even accidentally, contracts a spiritual impurity wherein his inherent sanctity is defiled and is restricted from entering the temple. To take this a step further, a nazarite is someone who has accepted to maintain a higher level of sanctity and is restricted from coming into contact with a corpse altogether. If he does accidentally, he must go through a process to re-begin his nazarite status because his high level sanctity was defiled- even though a regular Jew has no restriction of contact with a corpse (the exception being a Kohen who does in fact have a higher level of sanctity!)

So, similar to ba, it is comprehensible, on a religious plane, that a "bastard" who has a lower sanctity status as a result of a spiritually forbidden relationship is restricted from forming a religious spiritual bond with someone of a higher status of sanctity.

Of course if you look at everything on a physical plane it just sounds like the parents did a sin and now the child is restricted in who s/he cand spend life with.

Answer 2

These are my thoughts on the subject:

We are all obviously familiar with the concept of reward and punishment: When you do what G-d wants, He will reward you; when you do what He doesn't want, He will punish you (Lev. 26:3). But why should He ever punish someone: "Do I desire the death of an evil person?" (Eze. 18:23). Sin is not inherently bad — the only reason why G-d tells us not to do it is because the sin naturally hurts us, and so G-d makes the sin bad because a man naturally hates what is bad for him, and this now becomes bad for him (Rabbi Saadyah Gaon, Emunos VeDeos ch. 4).

The bad effect of sin is not a punishment; it is a natural consequence. You could really ask the same question about the punishment for an accidental sin — why do you need to bring a sacrifice for doing something accidentally (Lev. 4:2)? It must be that the punishment for sin is just a natural consequence. And if someone sins, and through that sin a bastard is born, the things that happen to him are just a natural effect of things. Of course, they are not a punishment, since the son didn't do anything.

I am not very knowledgeable in the subject of Jewish philosophy, though, so I am not sure if what I wrote is consistent with people other than Rabbi Saadyah.

Answer 3

I do not know any classic authorities which discuss this but here is a take I believe to be consistent with Jewish thought.

As noted in the linked discussion, the term bastard is a misleading translation. A mamzer is someone whose parents sexual relationship is inconceivable. The example I would use is that between a brother and a sister. We also apply this to adulterous relationships (though not to premarital relationships) but I think that a "modern secular humanist" can better relate to this concept as it pertains to the former case.

First it is simply a reality that in a number of different ways parents decisions have long term consequences for their offspring. This isn't a matter of forgiveness or not. Jewish tradition is clear that a mamzer can be a great person despite their deficient lineage.

Secondly, it seems to me, that in order for an individual to do teshuvah (repent) they must regret their transgression. Yet when that very severe transgression led to the birth of a beloved offspring how can one regret such behavior. Such regret becomes considerably easier to achieve when the inappropriateness of the child's conception is reflected in a deficient status.

Another way of looking at it is, with or without such a prohibition, many people would have serious reservations about marrying someone whose parents were siblings. This isn't an issue of punishment but a natural discomfort with the situation, and the ruling mirrors this natural discomfort.

Answer 4

Our actions have consequences. Someone chooses to shoot someone, the victim gets shot. (As for why G-d allows that to happen, that's a broader question.)

The Bible is making clear that adultery and incest are so bad, that before you ever think of doing either, be aware that any children resulting from it -- as a consequence -- will be prohibited from marrying into the mainstream. Yes, as a parent you're capable of horribly messing up your kid for life.

Note, very importantly, that a child born out of wedlock is not a mamzer; a mamzer is only a product of adultery or incest. And the only restriction on a mamzer is marrying into the mainstream Jewish lineage. So when seeking a marriage partner, the mamzer has to look for another mamzer, or a convert. That is the only point in their life when they are penalized.

Admittedly it still seems harsh, and one comment of the Sages interprets Ecclesiastes' note about "the tears of the oppressed" -- the injustice of which makes the king frustrated with life in general -- as referring to the plight of the mamzer.

Answer 5

First I'll address "How is it just to punish a child [sic] who did not have any participation in the sin?". I think this answer comes from Rambam's Moreh Nevuchim, but it may be from Gemara (I'll try to find the source).

Punishing a child for their parent's sin seems like something unjust, but in reality it is the parent who is bringing about spiritual-harm to their children through sinning and teaching their children to sin, not a direct punishment of a child for the sins their parent committed.

Let's use smoking as a physical example. If a parent is a smoker, their children are at risk for a number of physical issues from birth-defects to respiratory problems. The child themselves never smoked a cigarette and had no control over their domestic situation, but their parent's negligent-actions directly affects their health. Spiritually, sins work the same way. When a parent sins, they directly affect their children's spiritual-health via "second-hand-sinning". In most cases, a child can undo the harm of their parents' sins by refraining from doing that sin (teshuva), however this is frequently difficult for children to do when they are raised in a sinful environment.

As for the Mamzer aspect of the question, in the Moreh Nevuchim, Book 3, chapter XLIX, where Rambam is discussing Chukim, he says:

In order to create a horror of illicit marriages, a bastard was not allowed to marry an Israelitish woman (ibid. xxiii. 3): the adulterer and the adulteress were thus taught that by their act they bring upon their seed irreparable injury. In every language and in every nation the issue of licentious conduct has a bad name; the Law therefore raises the name of the Israelites by keeping them free from the admixture of bastards. The priests, who have a higher sanctity, are not allowed to marry a harlot, or a woman that is divorced from her husband, or that is profane (Lev. xxi 7): the high-priest, the noblest of the priests, must not marry even a widow, or a woman that has had sexual intercourse of any kind (ibid. xxi. 14). Of all these laws the reason is obvious. If bastards were prohibited to marry any member of the congregation of the Lord, how much more rigidly had slaves and handmaids to be excluded. The reason of the prohibition of inter-marriage with other nations is stated in the Law: "And thou take of their daughters unto thy sons, and their daughters go a whoring after their gods, and make thy sons go a whoring after their gods" (Exod. xxxiv. 16).

Also, Shabos 55a explains that Ezekiel 18:20 teaches there is no death without sin. A father won't die from his son's sins and a son won't die from his father's, everyone dies because they have sinned on their own, even Moshe and Aaron. It doesn't really have to do with punishing a child for their father's sin.

Answer 6

I think that the following approach has value:

In regard to the status of 'tamei le-meit' (impurity from contact with a corpse) and the procedure of 'parah adumah' (ashes of a red cow that, when sprinkled, remove that status of impurity), Yohanan ben Zakai comments:

לא המת מטמא ולא הפרה מטהרת ולא המים מטהרים. אלא אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא: חוקה חוקקתי, גזירה גזרתי. אין אתה רשאי לעבור על גזירתי. דכתיב: "זאת חוקת התורה

A corpse does not make one impure and a cow or ashes do not remove the impurity. Rather, the Holy One Blessed be He said, a law have I legislated, a decree have I decreed. You are not permitted to transgress my decrees, as it is written (Numbers 19:2), "this is the law of the Torah" [the word used for 'law' is 'huqah'].

I.e., There is no ulitmate value to purity vs. impurity. The only value is in the choice to carry out the pertinent mitzvah according to its rules.

The person who is tamei is not inferior to the person who is tahor. The cohen who is unfit to enter the Mikdash is no less valuable/lucky/holy than the cohen who is fit and does enter. A mamzeir is not inferior to a cohen gadol (and, depending on how much Torah they learn, can certainly be superior to a cohen gadol).

Granted, the specific mitzvah of the mamzeir not being able to marry is even more problematic because it denies the person options in life that could make them happy and fulfilled in the realm of human/material life. I would also add to this category the prohibition of mishkav zakhur and the situation of agunot. I don't have a justification for these things.

Answer 7

SethJ wrote:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presentism_%28literary_and_historical_analysis%29 Just because you define something as good, that does not mean it fits G-d's definition. Same for "punishment". Same for any moral discussion. Morality is not set by 21st Century Western standards. It is set by G-d (alternatively, morality is objective and is outlined by G-d).

yoel wrote:

The simplest answer is that the Creator of the universe determines what is just, not man.

Dan wrote:

this question presupposes two factors, both of which are erroneous: 1. that good is "good" to the exclusion of what man thinks of as "bad" and 2. that god's reasoning has to conform to man's conception of justice or right and wrong.

(They wrote these words in comments on the question, making a point that is really suitable for an answer and that has not really been covered in any of the answers-posted-as-answers to date. As I'm culling the much-too-numerous comments from the question, I'm posting it here to serve as an answer; I'm posting it as "community wiki" in order that I get no reputation points for others' words.)